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INTRODUCTION
Open government and equal access to decisionmaking processes are
cornerstones that ensure an accountable and democratically legitimate
Fourth Branch. The major statutes that govern administrative
policymaking-the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),' the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, 2 the Freedom of Information Act, 3 and the
Government in the Sunshine Act4-advance these principles. They do so
by providing formal opportunities for all interested parties to comment on
proposed rules and place data, studies, and other information into the
public record that then can serve as a basis for challenging agency decisions
in court.5 While there are disagreements about whether interest group
1. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2006).
2. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2006).
3. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
4. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006).
5. APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 706; see Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
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representation is the best way to ensure government accountability, there
are few disagreements that this is currently the method of choice in
administrative law.6
What remains much less settled, however, is whether or how well these
pluralistic mechanisms of oversight are working in the large and important
area of informal rulemakings. At one end of the spectrum, there is a good
deal of optimism that vigorous and balanced engagement in informal
rulemakings is occurring successfully, particularly in areas of social
regulation like environmental law. Professor James Q Wilson, for
example, observes that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) "has
had to deal with as many complaints and lawsuits from environmentalists as
from industry, despite the economic and political advantages industry
presumably enjoys." 7 In their study of interest group politics, Professors
Burdett Loomis and Allan Cigler conclude that by the early 1930s, a
"participation revolution" had arisen comprised of citizens and special
interest groups seeking collective material benefits for the public at large. 8
Professor Christopher Bosso adds to this positive characterization in his
study of pesticide politics: "[b]y the mid- 1980s, however, we find a diversity
in representation that, on the surface at least, gives pluralists some
vindication." 9  More recently, in his book on public interest regulation,
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1723, 1748 (1975) (documenting and critiquing
the liberalization of standing rules and the resulting greater judicial oversight of agency
rulemakings through what he calls the "interest representation" model).
6. Stewart in particular expressed great skepticism that broad participation rights
would transfer naturally to the vigorous representation of all interests affected by the
regulatory proceedings. See Stewart, supra note 5, at 1763; see also id. at 1303 (stating that
"[f] ull implementation of the formal participation and standing rights that are central to the
interest representation model of administrative law would enormously increase the expense
of the administrative process and might, in practice, increase the barriers to participation by
interests that are not well-organized or affluent"). See also Edward Rubin, it's Tm to Make the
Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 95 (2003) (arguing that the
current version of the APA, which relies on public participation, should be amended to
reflect a modem, administrative form of governance).
7. James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITCS OF REGULATION 385
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
8. Burdett A. Loomis & AllanJ. Cigler, Introduction: The Changing Nature ofInterest Group
Politics, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 1, 11 (AllanJ. Cigler & Burdett A. Loomis eds., 1983)
(opining that "[tjhe free-rider problem has proven not to be an insurmountable barrier to
group formation, and many new interest groups do not use selective material benefits to gain
support").
9. CHRISTOPHERJ. Bosso, PESTICIDES AND PoLiTics: THE LIFE CYCLE OF A PUBLIC
ISSUE 245 (1987). This is in part because "[e]nvironmental policies, by their nature, prompt
acrid disputes among equally determined and almost permanently mobilized sets of
claimants because they exhibit structures of incentives more contagious to conflict than do
agricultural subsidies or water projects." Id. at 252.
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Professor Steven Croley argues that "[w]hile one can still distinguish among
regulatory decisions according to the amount of public attention they
generate or the number of outside participants they involve, few agency
decisions with significant stakes escape public attention or participation
completely. Regulatory decisionmaking is seldom done in the dark
anymore."10
At the other end of the spectrum, a number of scholars, particularly in
the political sciences, question whether administrative processes actually
provide this type of balanced access to and influence over the rulemaking
process for all affected groups." A common thread in this literature is the
superior influence over agencies that business groups enjoy by virtue of
their organization and financial resources. 12 Business groups further benefit
from the agencies' need for information that only regulated interests can
provide. 13 The resultant, regular communications between agency officials
and industry are alleged to induce the former to see the world through the
eyes of the latter.' 4
Lying just beneath these general debates over who participates in publicly
important rules is the equally important question of how they participate.
In administrative law, notice and comment is the formal vehicle that
provides affected parties with equal access to agency rulemakings. 15 Yet
over the last decade there have been suggestions that in practice, notice-
and-comment rulemaking may only be the tip of the iceberg in providing
avenues for interest groups to inform agencies' rulemaking projects. 16
Specifically, considerable negotiations may take place between the agency
and interest groups during the development of the rule and also after the
promulgation of the final rule that fall wholly outside of the APA's
10. STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF
GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 291-92 (2008).
11. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., JOHN E. CHUBB, INTEREST GROUPS AND THE BUREAUcRACY: THE
POLITICS OF ENERGY 251 (1983) (concluding from his study that interest group participation
in energy policymaking consists almost exclusively of "the most technically competent
groups"-i.e., industry).
13. See, e.g., RONALD J. HREBENAR, INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN AMERICA (3d ed.
1997) 261-62 (discussing a range of ways that regulated parties can control agencies,
including by wearing them down with information-intensive claims).
14. See, e.g., MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION (1955); Samuel P. Huntingon, The Marasmus of the ICC. The Commission, the
Railroads, and the Pblic Interes4 in PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLIcY 58 (Peter Woll ed.,
1966).
15. See APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
16. See, e.g., William F. West, Inside the Black Box: The Development of Proposed Rules and the
Limits of Procedural Controls, 41 ADMIN. & SOc'Y 576 (2009).
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regulatory reach, both in terms of the required recordkeeping and in
equalizing access to the agency at key points in policy development.
1 7
Similar imbalances may occur for related reasons during the notice-and-
comment process itself, at least for rulemakings that become so bloated with
technicality, complexity, and the fragmentation of issues into minutiae that
the rulemaking project becomes practically inaccessible to less resourceful
groups. 18
Despite the diversity of views regarding how well this administrative
process is working, surprisingly little empirical work has been conducted on
the nature and effects of public participation in federal rulemakings. 19 A
critical reason for this gap is the difficulty in obtaining and analyzing data.
Methodological barriers also impede empirical study of the capacity of legal
procedures to ensure that federal agencies are publicly accountable and
that their rules fairly reflect the public interest.20 Fortunately, the empirical
work that has been done on the administrative system has produced not
only important findings, but also some significant methodological
breakthroughs.2 1 This work suggests that interest group imbalances may be
occurring throughout administrative law and provides new and promising
tools for exploring these imbalances in greater detail.
In an effort to build on preceding empirical research, in this Article we
trace the engagement and to a lesser extent, the influence of interest groups
over the entire life cycle of a complete set of complex EPA rules that set
emissions standards for the industrial release of air toxins. In particular we
focus on three of the most worrisome phases of administrative process
where imbalances in interest group engagement and influence may be
occurring. The thesis of this study is that imbalances in interest group
engagement are occurring at critical, albeit somewhat obscure stages of the
17. See infra Parts I.B. I and I.B.2.
18. See infra Part I.B.3.
19. See, e.g, Steven J. Balla, Between Commenting and Negotiation: The Contours of Public
Participation in Agency Rulemaking, 1 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 59, 67 (2005)
(highlighting the dearth of research on interest group engagement in rulemakings); Scott R.
Furlong & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participation in Rule Making: A Decade of Change,
15J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &THEORY 353, 355 (2005) (discussing research about interest group
participation in rulemaking); William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes,
Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Anaysis, 64
PUB. ADMIN. R-Ev. 66, 70-72 (2004) (describing work by several authors regarding
participation in rulemaking).
20. See, e.g., CROLEY, supra note 10, at 125-33 (discussing various methodological and
data barriers to studying the administrative process); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb
Yackee, A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the US. Bureaucracy, 68 J.
POL. 128 (2006).
21. See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
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rulemaking life cycle and that these imbalances are impacting the substance
of the rulemaking project.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I explores three stages in the
rulemaking life cycle that may be afflicted with imbalanced interest group
engagement that in turn might distort the outcome of the rulemaking
project. Part II describes the methods of the Article, which examine the
nature of interest group engagement and activity at these problem stages in
a complete set of rules promulgated by EPA governing the industrial
emissions of air toxics. Part III describes the findings, and Part IV collects
information from disparate sources in detective-like fashion to explain some
of the surprises and new questions that emerge from this research. In the
Conclusion, we retell the story that emerges from our data and consider
whether it suggests more pervasive problems in administrative law that will
benefit from further study.
I. INTEREST GROUPS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: BACKGROUND AND
PROBLEM AREAS
Interest group participation is vital to ensuring the accountability and
legitimacy of the administrative state, yet this participation also carries the
potential to derail the work of agencies in ways that cause rulemakings to
depart substantially from the four corners of the authorizing statute and the
goals of public interest regulation. This Part provides a brief orientation to
the conflicting role of interest groups in administrative process and then
focuses on three phases of administrative process that appear most at risk of
suffering from imbalances in interest group participation and influence.
A. Interest Group Representation and Administrative Accountability
Rigorous engagement by a diverse and balanced assortment of affected
interests, reinforced by an ability of these interests to challenge regulations
in court, provide one of the primary mechanisms to ensure at least some
democratic legitimacy of the administrative state. Professor Rubin observes
that this pluralistic engagement is so important to current conceptions of
administrative process that the APA is essentially a one-trick pony: "All of
its basic provisions rely on a single method for controlling the actions of
administrative agencies, namely, participation by private parties." 22 Even
in the Attorney General's Report that helped make the case for passage of
the APA, the need for this pluralistic oversight of agencies was considered
pivotal to the success of the administrative state: "Participation by these
[economic and community-based] groups in the rule-making process is
22. Rubin, supra note 6, at 101.
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essential in order to permit administrative agencies to inform themselves
and to afford adequate safeguards to private interests." 23  As Professor
Rubin points out, moreover, a "due process" orientation runs throughout
administrative process to ensure that affected parties are able to hold the
agency accountable, not only in receiving their input, but in taking that
input into account.2 4 Notice-and-comment rulemaking, in particular, is
designed to open the door to any and all information that a party wishes to
provide.2 5
Yet while the opportunity to lodge comments is a vital step that ensures
that the agency is adequately educated about the issues, the comment
process, standing alone, does not ensure that the agency will take the
comments seriously. Indeed, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, there was
increasing concern about "regulatory capture," which generally (but not
always) referred to the deployment of various financial inducements (i.e.,
the prospect of future employment, gifts, or bribes) by regulated parties to
co-opt individual regulators. 26 In cases of these financially based forms of
agency capture, all the information and comments in the world cannot
budge agency staff from their predetermined course of favoring regulated
parties in the development and enforcement of regulations. 27
23. ATT'Y GEN. COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 103 (194 1).
24. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 6, at 111 (arguing that some of the APA's procedural
requirements are modeled after "due process" protections in adjudication).
25. See, e.g., id. at 114 ("Once the notice is given, anyone may send the agency a
comment, and agencies always accept these comments (indeed, how could they not, unless
they returned the envelope for insufficient postage?")). A rule can even be remanded if the
agency has neglected-however inadvertently-to make a complete library of relevant
documents available for commenters to use in formulating their arguments. See, e.g., Gerber
v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 181-82 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Fish and Wildlife
Service's failure to make the map of an offsite mitigation area available for public viewing in
the issuance of an incidental take permit deprived plaintiff of the meaningful opportunity to
comment and required that the case be remanded back to the agency).
26. See, e.g., Ernesto Dal B6, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. OF EcON.
POL'Y 203, 214-16 (2006) (emphasizing the research on the revolving door form of capture).
Indeed, a recent illustration of this traditional agency capture is the Minerals Management
Service's (MMS's) cozy relationship with the oil industry: the oil industry offered future
employment opportunities (the revolving door), provided various gifts, and nurtured
supportive and even intimate relationships with individual regulators. See Dan Froomkin,
Regulatory Capture of Oil Drilling Agengy Exposed in Repor HUFFINGTON POST (Sep. 8, 2010, 6:30
PM , http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/08/report-illustrates-regula-n-
709681 .html.
27. See generally Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatoo,
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1284 (2006) (observing how capture theory is based on the
premise that well-organized groups gain an advantage through contributing votes and
resources); Michael E. Levine &Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
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At the urging of both commentators and judges, the courts emerged in
the 1970s as a critical counterforce to address the problem of this more
traditional form of regulatory capture. While the APA requires the agency
to "consider" comments in promulgating the final rule,28 without the ability
to sue the agency when it failed in this duty, the requirement was
unenforceable. Liberalized standing requirements developed by the courts
in the 1970s ultimately allowed public interest groups to file suit against
captured rules that were also arbitrary, thus providing some assurance that
the worst cases of capture would likely be caught.2 9 Some courts even
engaged in hard look review, which provided the agency with still a greater
risk of being caught in cozy relationships with a narrow slice of interested
parties.3 ° The resulting design of administrative process evolved to depend
on a diverse and broad set of interest groups to provide both input and
oversight of the agencies.3'
Even with this new and vigorous oversight facilitated by the courts,
however, there remained concerns about other forms of capture of the
administrative machinery by regulated parties. As early as the 1980s, top
theorists in political science developed conceptual models that predicted
that most institutionally based capture, resulting from intrinsic limits in the
ability of diverse groups to participate, might occur in rulemaking settings
where complexity was high and the costs of regulation was concentrated on
a narrow group of well-financed stakeholders. In his classic four-quadrant
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6J.L. EcON. & ORG. 167, 178 (1990) (describing capture
theory as the "adoption by the regulator for self-regarding (private) reasons, such as
enhancing electoral support or postregulatory compensation, of a policy which would not be
ratified by an informed polity free of organization costs").
28. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). See generaly MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE
GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 44-49 (1988) (discussing the history
of administrative law since 1946 and how the goal of expanding access to government led to
the rule whereby interested groups could provide comments to rulemaking agencies that
these agencies must consider); Stewart, supra note 5, at 1717-60 (discussing broadly the
importance of responding to comments in surviving judicial review).
29. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 1039, 1043 (1997) ("[T]he courts' assertiveness during the period from roughly 1967
to 1983 can be explained by judicial disenchantment with the idea of policymaking by
expert and nonpolitical elites .... The principal pathology emphasized during these years
was 'capture,' meaning that agencies were regarded as being uniquely susceptible to
domination by the industry they were charged with regulating.").
30. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Leventhal, J.,
concurring) (arguing for hard look review).
31. In his book, Professor Croley provides compelling case studies of high-visibility
rules promulgated by several agencies, including EPA, that were subjected to impressive
displays of public interest advocacy made possible by these overriding commitments to open
and equal access to government. See CROLEY, supra note 10, at 242.
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typology of regulation, for example, Professor James Q. Wilson predicts
that when the benefits of a policy are diffused across the population and the
costs are concentrated on a small group of regulated parties, the agency is
more at risk of capture unless a charismatic entrepreneur emerges who acts
as the "vicarious representative" of the public beneficiaries. 32 Professor
Gormley similarly predicted that for rules that are highly complex and non-
salient, "board room politics" will prevail (i.e., a single set of interests work
closely with the agency to develop the rule in a relatively nontransparent
setting).33  Moreover, in both settings capture occurs not only through
inducements by regulated parties, but because regulated parties enjoy
primary access to and control over critical information needed by agencies,
with only limited oversight from other watchdog groups due to the low
salience and high complexity of the rulemakings.
Although theoretical models on interest group engagement in
rulemakings have not developed much beyond those originated by
Gormley and Wilson in the 1980s, subsequent analysts have identified
specific ways that legitimate administrative processes can be hijacked by a
narrow group of affected parties at the expense of advancing the broader
public interest. For example, various forms of "sophisticated sabotage"
involve utilizing the tools of administrative law to control how issues are
framed, conceived, and communicated. 34 Highly resourceful parties can
also play information games to gain an edge in the regulatory proceedings.
More than thirty years ago, Professors Owen and Braeutigam underscored
how stakeholders' "ability to control the flow of information to the
regulatory agency is a crucial element in affecting decisions." 35 Based on
this power, they observe how these stakeholders can make available
"carefully selected facts," withhold others, and if delay is useful, "floodf the
32. See Wilson, supra note 7, at 367-70 (1980). Professor Wilson's four quadrants of
politics categorize regulation according to the distribution of benefits (concentrated or
diffuse) on the one hand, and the distribution of costs (concentrated or diffuse) on the other.
The specific categories include not only "entrepreneurial politics," in which benefits are
broad but the costs of a policy are concentrated, but also "majoritarian politics," in which
society in general incurs both the benefits and the cost of the policy; "interest-group
politics," in which both the costs and benefits of a policy are concentrated on a narrow set of
interests; and "client politics," in which the benefits of a policy accrue to a narrow set of
interests and the costs are spread over the entire population. Id.
33. See Willian T. Gormley, Jr., Regulatoy Issue Networks in a Federal System, 18 POLITY
595, 607 (1986).
34. See generally THOMAS 0. McGARITY, SIDNEY SHAPIRO & DAVID BOLLIER,
SOPHISTICATED SABOTAGE: THE INTELLECTUAL GAMES USED TO SUBVERT RESPONSIBLE
REGULATION (2004).
35. BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC
USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 4 (1978).
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agency with more information than it can absorb." 36 When the agency
seeks a particularly damaging piece of information that can't be legally
withheld, the interest group's "best tactic is to bury it in a mountain of
irrelevant material" or provide it, but simultaneously "deny its reliability
and ... commence a study to acquire more reliable data." 37
Recent empirical evidence provides support for the possibility that this
institutional capture is in fact occurring in some areas of administrative
practice. Several different researchers find systematic biases that favor
regulated parties in rules promulgated by several different agencies,
including agencies like EPA that are generally viewed as resistant to
traditional forms of agency capture. 38 Specifically, Professors Yackee &
Yackee, 39 Golden,40 Coglianese, 41 and Cropper et al.42 all conducted studies
that assess the diversity of interest group representation in environmental
36. Id.
37. Id. These techniques can also be deployed in more adversarial settings to overcome
the opposition's efforts. For example, "[i]f another party has supplied damaging
information, it is important to supply contrary information in as technical a form as possible
so that a hearing is necessary to settle the issues of 'fact."' Id. The authors even advise the
regulated parties to deploy decentralized information systems so that officials can be selected
who can testify truthfully on what they know, but be carefully protected from other,
conflicting or damaging sources of information. Id.
38. See, e.g., CROLEY, supra note 10, at 290-96; RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO,
THE PEOPLE'S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL
INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, AND THREATS TO HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
45-47 (2010); Sally Katzen, A Reality Check on an Empirical Study: Comments on "Inside the
Administrative State," 105 MICH. L. REV. 1497, 1505 (2007) (drawing upon her stint as
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) under President
Clinton to state EPA focuses like a laser on protecting the environment).
39. See Yackee & Yackee, supra note 20, at 131, 133 (studying forty lower-salience
rulemakings promulgated by four different federal agencies and finding that business
interests submitted 57% of comments, whereas nongovernmental organizations submitted
22% of comments, 6% of which came from public interest groups).
40. See generally Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who
Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245 (1998) (studying
eight rules promulgated by federal agencies using content analysis to determine who
participates and influences federal regulations and finding citizen engagement in five of the
eight rules).
41. Professor Coglianese estimated that EPA promulgated 334 rules per year from
1986 to 1990. See Cary Coglianese, Challenging the Rules: Litigation and Bargaining in the
Administrative Process 73, tbl.2-2 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of
Michigan) (on file with authors) (finding businesses participating in 96% and national
environmental groups participating in 44% of rules).
42. See, e.g., Maureen L. Cropper et al., The Determinants of Pesticide Regulation: A Statistical
Analysis of EPA Decision Making, 100J. POL. ECON. 175, 178, 187 (1992) (examining interest
group engagement in pesticide registrations between 1975 and 1989 and finding
environmentalists participated in 49% of the cancellations).
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and public health rules and each find the public interest groups absent from
about half of the rules in their data set. In three of these four studies,
moreover, the analysts found public interest groups were substantially
outnumbered by regulated parties even when they did participate.
43
Golden and Yackee & Yackee went still further and actually tested whether
regulated parties enjoyed more influence over the changes made by the
agency in the final rule. Yackee & Yackee detected a distinct "bias toward
business" in which the changes made to the final rule tended to favor
regulated parties rather than the public interest.44 Golden, on the other
hand, found that in general the agencies resisted making any major changes
to the rule, and when they did make changes, the changes tended to favor
commenters who supported the proposed rule over the critics.
45
B. Rulemaking in the Shade
Even though administrative process considers sunlight as the best
disinfectant, 46 it is also true as Professor Strauss notes, that "candor and the
flexibility necessary for collaboration or compromise are more likely to
flourish in the shade."' 47 The thesis of this Article is that it is in these shaded
or partly shaded areas where much of the regulatory work gets done. In
particular, this Article builds on prior findings of aggregate evidence of
industry bias in rulemakings by examining three of the shadiest stages
within the agency's own rulemaking life cycle in search of evidence of
interest group imbalance and bias. 48 At each of these stages, there are
43. See Coglianese, supra note 41, at 73; Golden, supra note 40, at 247; Yackee &
Yackee, supra note 20, at 133.
44. See Yackee & Yackee, supra note 20, at 133-35.
45. See Golden, supra note 40, at 262.
46. Louis Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, HARPER'S WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 1913, available
at http://www.law.louisville.edu/library/collections/brandeis/node/ 196.
47. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government.- Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 573, 595 (1984).
48. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review constitutes another worrisome
shady area given the lack of transparency of OMB input, as well as the forces motivating
OMB review. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight of Agency Decision
making 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010) (discussing the lack of transparency in OMB review).
In this Article, we examine only those stages of the rulemaking where the agency is engaged
directly with interested parties and leave for a later time an investigation of the OMB-
induced shade in rules that could potentially lead to even greater distortions in interest
group representation. See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside
the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REv. 47,
78, 86 (2006) (conducting this type of investigation at a broad scale); Steven Croley, White
House Review of Ageny Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CH. L. REv. 821, 822-23
(2003) (examining presidential involvement in rulemaking).
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opportunities for skewed interest group engagement and influence, in part
as a result of the complexity and information intensiveness of the
rulemaking task and in part as a result of the agency's own incentives to
mollify litigious stakeholders in order to get their rule promulgated in a
reasonable period of time. Individually, each of these stages can lead to
some distortions in the diversity of interest groups that participate;
cumulatively these stages may reveal systematic skews in the practical
accessibility of the rulemaking process to the full range of affected
stakeholders.
1. Rule Development (the Pre-Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) Period)
The first opportunity for imbalanced interest group input into
rulemakings occurs during the formative development of a proposed rule.
The basic administrative process focuses interest group activity on an open
notice-and-comment process, where parties comment on the agency's
proposed rule.49 Based on these comments, the agency may then revise the
rule in final form and, if the agency arbitrarily rejects comments, it can be
sued in the court of appeals.
Ironically, however, the emphasis on developing a proposed rule that is
ready for comment pushes a great deal of the policymaking and true
regulatory work earlier in the process, during the rule development stage.50
Indeed, the courts have made it painfully clear that if a rule is to survive
judicial review, it must be essentially in final form at the proposed rule
stage.51 Material changes made after this point require a new notice-and-
comment process and may even require the agency to start over. 52 To
49. APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
50. See, e.g., West, supra note 16, at 580 (noting the irony of how mechanisms for
institutional accountability may tend to shift the actual policymaking to an earlier point in
the process where the mechanisms are not in full effect).
51. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 757-63 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that
the agency failed to provide meaningful notice-and-comment opportunities on issues in the
final rule; the issues were raised by commenters during the notice-and-comment process);
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1021-22 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding the same
result as the Shell case); see also Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 995-98 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (vacating an EPA rule setting forth monitoring requirements because the agency
"flip flopped" after notice and comment and the final rule was not a logical outgrowth of the
proposed rule, thus violating the APAs notice-and-comment requirements); see generally
Chocolate Mfrs. Ass'n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Department
of Agriculture failed to provide meaningful notice-and-comment opportunities on issues in
the final rule).
52. See, e.g.,Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 856, 893-900 (2007) (criticizing courts for adding the requirement that
agencies go through a second notice-and-comment process when the final rule is not the
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avoid the need to make material changes, the agency is eager to "'get it
right the first time."' 53  Thus a basic incentive for agencies to produce
nearly complete proposed rules arises from the courts' commitment to due
process, which demands that interested parties have an opportunity to
comment on all significant aspects of a proposed rule.5 4
Given these incentives, working relationships, primarily with regulated
parties, are likely to form at the pre-proposal stage in large part to minimize
the need to make "material changes" after notice and comment. Industry
enjoys a particularly privileged position in the development of rules like the
air toxic emission standards because industry possesses a great deal of in-
house information on industrial processes that EPA needs to write the
rules.55 For agency staff eager to get the final rule in place so as to create
some binding requirement on the polluting activities of industry, then, such
pre-NPRM collaborations become legal necessities. Even agency staffers
skeptical of industry claims may actively seek out industry's help in
developing the proposed rule to reduce the risk of successful challenges
down the road. As one agency staffer put it, "'[wle help them; they help
US. "
56
"logical outgrowth" of the proposed rule and discussing how this requirement impedes
agency adaptability to new information during the notice-and-comment period). See generally
RIcHARDJ. PIERCE,JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 7.3 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing
the extensive case law on whether an agency's notice was adequate based on subsequent
developments occurring after the proposed rule in the course of the rulemaking).
53. West, supra note 16, at 582 (quoting a senior attorney in the agency); see, e.g., E.
Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemakirg, 41 DUKE LJ. 1490, 1495 (1992) ("Because of the
need to create a record, real public participation-the kind of back and forth dialogue in
which minds (and rules) are really changed-primarily takes place in various fora well in
advance of a notice of proposed rulemaking appearing in the Federal Register.").
54. Cf Rubin, supra note 6, at 111 (arguing that this type of procedural requirement is
modeled after "due process" protections in adjudication).
55. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. For example, one attorney
interviewed in the Field and Robb report observed,
The reason that the Agency is generally receptive to well-reasoned technical
comments .. .is that if you point out specific problems with a regulatory program,
then those drafting the rules will generally try to solve those problems. They will do so
not only because they want to appear to be reasonable and responsive to public
comments, but also because their willingness to refine a regulatory program-to
address identified flaws in the program-should help that program withstand judicial
review.
Andrea Bear Field & Kathy E.B. Robb, EPA Rulemakings: Fiewsfrom Inside and Outside, 5 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 9, 50 (1990).
56. Coglianese, supra note 41, at 14.
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Hypothesis: Agency contacts with affected parties during rule development (pre-
NPRM) will be extensive and will be dominated by regulated parties.
At the same time that legal incentives encourage the agency to engage
with interest groups in general and regulated parties in particular in
advance of notice and comment, the agency at this stage is also free of
docketing and related APA transparency requirements. The agency is
required to log ex parte contacts in the public record only after publishing
the proposed rule and generally not before. 57  By contrast, letters,
conferences, meetings, telephone conversations, shared drafts of a proposed
rule, and the like occurring during the development of the proposed rule
are not limited and need not even be recorded in the rule's administrative
record if the agency prefers to keep them under wraps. 58
Several administrative law theorists have expressed concern that this pre-
NPRM rule development phase may largely eclipse the significance of the
notice-and-comment period with respect to interest group input.59 These
57. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding
that "communications which are received prior to issuance of a formal notice of rulemaking
do not, in general have to be put in a public file.... [But once] a notice of proposed
rulemaking has been issued... any agency official or employee who is or may reasonably be
expected to be involved in the decisional process of the rulemaking proceeding, should
[avoid ex parte contacts and place any such contacts in the public file]").
58. Interested parties engaged in these communications, however, will include them in
the administrative record when it suits their purposes. In some cases, interest groups even
request EPA background documents through FOIA and include them in their comments to
make sure they are part of the record. See, e.g., William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and
Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE Lj. 38, 68-70 (1975) (observing that "this tactic [to use FOIA
to access agency documents and then to communicate them back to the agency to ensure
that they make their way into the administrative record] has worked fairly well for those who
use it, even though the statute probably wasn't intended for that purpose").
59. See, e.g., Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 19, at 353 (noting the possibility for
important participatory opportunities in the development of the proposed rule); CORNELIUS
M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY
73-85 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing participation in the various stages of rulemaking); West, supra
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scholars also hypothesize that during the rule development stage, interest
group contacts may not be anywhere close to diverse or balanced.60
As an empirical matter, however, little is known about the rule
development phase.61 West, Kerwin, and Coglianese conducted extensive
interviews with agency staff, which only serve to reinforce the possibility
that this phase is an important part of rulemaking.62 However, beyond
their research, there has been very little empirical work into the extent or
role of pre-NPRM discussions.
2. After the Rule Is Final (the Post-Final Period)
A second opportunity for ad hoc, unrecorded interest group influence of
agency rules arises after the rule is promulgated as final. At this point,
interest groups can file petitions for reconsideration and ultimately appeal
the rule to the Court of Appeals. 63 Yet, short of taking a case all the way
through court, there are numerous opportunities for invisible negotiations
and reconciliations that could affect the substance of the rule, perhaps in
dramatic ways.
Ad hoc Notice Petitions/
Participa- and Appeals
tion from Comment from
Interest from Interest
Groups Interest Groups
Groups
Rule PrpsdFnl Negotiation on
Detvopment RueRl Mue re,',ions
and
interpretations
Hypotktesis. After the rules are promulgated as final, interest group activity will
continue on a significant percentage of them and revisions will be made to the rules that
note 16, at 580-82, 584-85 (arguing that the pre-NPRM period provides rich opportunities
for informal contacts and engagement by agencies with stakeholders).
60. In particular, and as discussed earlier, this "prenotice participation is potentially
subject to the alleged bias in favor of the 'special interests' or 'subgovernment actors' that
notice-and-comment requirements are designed to counter." West, supra note 16, at 589.
61. "Scholars have practically ignored these earlier processes" that occur during rule
development. Id. at 583.
62. See, e.g., Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 19, at 354, 362-65; KERwIN, supra note 59,
at 64; West, supra note 16, at 584-85 (using interviews to probe the opportunity for
interested parties to participate in rulemaking).
63. See APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006) (describing the appropriate scope of judicial
review).
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reflect these post-final negotiations. Regulated parties will again dominate this interest
group activity.
In his unpublished study of EPA rulemakings, Professor Coglianese
observes that post-rule "litigation offers interest groups and the agency an
opportunity to do something they were not permitted to do in the notice-
and-comment period: negotiate in secret. ' 64  Administrative rules
governing ex parte participation again do not apply in this post-final stage,
and in fact, "settlement negotiations between interest group and EPA
attorneys hold an added degree of secrecy given their privileged status." 65
Because of their privileged status, these agreements can even help
"immunize agency officials from oversight by third parties such as the
Office of Management and Budget." 66
In a way that parallels the opportunities for input during rule
development, then, interest groups are allowed a second bite at the apple
after the rule is final. Changes to guidances, enforcement protocols, and
other non-rule documents emerging from the post-final rule discussions can
be made with no public notice, despite their potentially substantial impact
on how the rule is implemented. 67 A trade association's general counsel
elaborated: "[Litigation] is often a vehicle to kind of lead to a revision of
regulations.... There are a number of cases that are filed and
automatically stayed because we are filing them just so we go back to the
agency and basically kind of renegotiate the regs. ' '68 Another corporate
counsel remarked, "It is almost like having another rulemaking with those
people who care enough about the issues to spend the time, being the ones
64. Coglianese, supra note 41, at 153.
65. Cary Coglianese, Litigating within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory
Process, 30 LAw & Soc'y REV. 735, 758 (1996); see also Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Administrative Procedure: The Public Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DuKE LJ. 1015, 1029-30
(2001) (describing the problematic features of the secrecy of many of the settlements); Jeffrey
M. Gaba, Informal Rulemaking by Settlement Agreement, 73 GEO. LJ. 1241, 1254 (1985)
(discussing potential secrecy of rulemaking settlements).
66. Coglianese, supra note 41, at 190.
67. See, e.g., Gaba, supra note 65, at 1245-48 (describing the types of substantive
agreements that can be reached in settlement agreements); see Patrick Schmidt, Pursuing
Regulatoy Relief Strategic Participation and Litigation in U.S. OSHA Rulemaking, 4 Bus. & POL. 71
(2002), (highlighting the significance of rulemaking settlements that lead to changes in
interpretive guidance); cf. Richard G. Stoll, Coping with the RCRA Hazardous Waste System: A
Few Practical Points for Fun and Profit, 1 ENVTL. HAZARDs 6, 6-7 (1989), reprinted in
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 257, 257-58 (Robert C.
Percival, et al. eds., 2d. ed. 1996) (describing how EPA's private letters, obscure guidance
documents, and hidden statements in unrelated final rule preambles have given industry
participants considerable room to "play" while remaining compliant with hazardous waste
rules).
68. Coglianese, supra note 41, at 127 (alteration in original).
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who get to play."69 Even more troubling is the fact that, in some cases,
these post-rule settlement negotiations may actually undo some of the
pluralistic gains made earlier in the process. Professor Coglianese, for
example, observed that
[i]n the wood preserving rule, the 267 individuals and groups filing
comments on the rule narrowed down to three groups in court. Greenpeace
and the Environmental Defense Fund were extremely active in the
rulemaking, but did not enter the litigation. As a result, positions these
environmental groups successfully advanced in the rulemaking were later
directly undercut in the litigation process. 70
Again, the administrative process indirectly facilitates these post-final
rule deals. 7 1 Interested parties can threaten to hold up the rule in litigation,
which can take years to resolve and ultimately may end in a reversal and
remand of the rule to the agency. 72 Faced with this uncertain fate for
health-protective rules, agencies may find that further compromises are
preferable to continued delay of the rule. Regulated parties may also have
a leg up in gaining the agencies' attention because they are more likely to
seek out claims that lead to rule delays, compared with environmental
groups, who might choose remedies that avoid vacating a rule entirely. 73
The extent to which rulemaking challenges are ultimately settled by
agencies like EPA is unknown, but there is evidence that it might be a
relatively common occurrence. 74 There is also evidence that the form a
69. Id. at 131.
70. Id. at 153.
71. See, e.g., Elizabeth Fisher & Patrick Schmidt, Seeing the 'Blind Spots' in Administrative
Law: Theory, Practice, and Rule-making Settlements in the United States, 30 COMMON L. WORLD
REV. 272, 288 (2001) (concluding that rulemaking settlements "are an unintended
consequence of the system as it structured").
72. See, e.g., Arteva Specialties S.A.R.L. v. EPA, 323 F.3d 1088, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(remanding to EPA for clarification of a standard).
73. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. EPA, 167 F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting the
plaintiff environmental group specifically requested the court to remand, but not vacate, the
challenged rule promulgated by EPA).
74. See, e.g., Gaba, supra note 65, at 1247 & n.26 (suggesting that EPA "has relied
extensively on such agreements to implement major portions of its water, hazardous waste,
and air programs"; and also pointing out that "[n]o filing system at the EPA could record
the number or percentage of regulations preceded by a settlement agreement"); Rossi, supra
note 65, at 1018 (observing that "[a]gencies routinely enter into settlements limiting the
scope of their regulatory discretion"). Professor Coglianese found that "nearly half of all the
petitions for review filed against EPA in the DC Circuit Court of Appeals between 1979 and
1990 ended with a voluntarily dismissal by the parties-before any oral hearing was held by
a judge." Coglianese, supra note 65, at 756 (footnote omitted). See also Robert V. Percival, The
Bounds of Consent Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental Policy-making, 1987 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 327 (discussing the usefulness of consent decrees and the disadvantages to
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rulemaking settlement takes varies widely with regard both to its terms and
its transparency. 75  Despite the seemingly significant empirical and
theoretical questions that rulemaking settlements raise, they remain largely
unexplored in the administrative law literature. 76
3. The Notice-and-Comment Process in Complex Rulemakings
Finally, the notice-and-comment process itself may be "open" to all, but
in practice accessible to only a few, at least when rules are very complex
and technical. This occurs because of the important role of information
costs in impeding engagement. 77 When a rule preamble is highly technical,
complex, and exceedingly lengthy, and the issues are fractured into minute
subparts, then the costs of understanding and processing the rule, and
hence participating in the comment period, can be quite high. While
expert, sophisticated public interest groups may be able to penetrate these
costly rules, even they will lack resources to engage in all of them and may
find they must dedicate resources to only a few.
Yet, if an interested party does not lodge detailed comments with the
restricting their application); Peter M. Shane, Federal Policy Making by Consent Decree: An
Analysis of Agency and Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241 (discussing rulemaking
settlements and efforts to limit them). Interestingly, some of the earlier literature discussing
these settlements gives the impression that they largely occurred with public interest groups
rather than industry. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by
Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40
STAN. L. REv. 203, 274, 278 (1987) (discussing public interest use of rulemaking settlements).
75. See, e.g., Fisher & Schmidt, supra note 71, at 282-87 (detailing the various types and
consequences of rulemaking settlements in broad terms); Gaba, supra note 65, at 1246-47
(discussing the various forms of settlement agreements); see also supra notes 64-66 and
accompanying text (regarding transparency of rulemaking settlements).
76. See, e.g., Fisher & Schmidt, supra note 71, at 288-89 (bemoaning the lack of
attention to rulemaking settlements, highlighting it as an illustration of a blind spot in
existing administrative law theory, and calling for more empirical research on them as well
as other blind spots). It is not that there is no literature, however. For the most
comprehensive analyses of potential problems with rulemaking settlements, see Gaba, supra
note 65, at 1255 (concluding that "[s]ettlement agreements work because of their secrecy
and enforceability. Both of these 'advantages' raise questions about the legitimacy of the
process and the final regulations it produces" and discussing these misgivings in considerable
detail). See also Rossi, supra note 65, at 1031-32, 1044-57 (raising questions about the
accountability of rulemaking settlements and offering suggestions for reform); Citizens for a
Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wilkey, J., dissenting)
(lamenting the "evil[s] of. .. consent decree[s]" as methods for settling rulemaking disputes
that involve policy considerations).
77. See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59
DUKE LJ. 1321, 1379 (2010) (crediting the higher cost to nonprofits of accessing and
mastering technical information with participation disparity relative to industry
counterparts).
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agency during this critical phase of the rule's life cycle, then it waives the
opportunity to file an appeal later, and at least as a legal matter, loses all of
its legal leverage. 78  The agency has no legal obligation to consider
comments shared outside of the comment period. 79 Information costs that
are high in rulemakings, then, can also work as a barrier to diverse
participation by all affected parties and allow the more informed and better
resourced to effectively dominate the proceedings.
and
ICO entl
Iterest
Proposed Final
Rule Rule
LEGEND
Black - Regulated Industry
White - Public Intcrest Groups and other Public Health Advocates
Hypothesis: The formal comments lodged on a complex rule will come
predominantly from regulated industy, and the changes made to the proposed rule in the
final rule will mirror this imbalance and generally favor industy.
Thus, for highly complex and technical rules, the comment activity may
be skewed in favor of industry, with the resulting rulemakings operating at
least in partial shade, free of oversight and input from the full range of
affected groups, particularly those representing the public interest. Indeed,
to the extent that regulated parties have an advantage in understanding the
nuances of the proposed rule as a result of their extensive pre-NPRM
communications, the barriers to outsiders may be still higher. The agency's
underlying logical processes and assumptions may be relatively obscure in
its proposed rule, for example, which will require commenters to engage in
added detective work and time-consuming re-creations of the agency's
78. See generaly McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969) (setting out the reasons
for exhausting remedies first within the agency before raising the issue with the court).
79. See, e.g., Mossville Envtl. Action Now v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1232, 1238-40 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (holding that public interest groups had waived several challenges to EPA's Hazardous
Air Pollutants rule because they had failed to file written comments and exhaust their
administrative remedies and the state comments they attempted to rely on were not specific
enough to provide EPA with notice of their concerns).
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thought process in order to understand key decisions. 80 These costs may
serve as a particularly significant barrier to the ability of resource-limited
groups to participate in the rulemaking process.
During the notice-and-comment process, moreover, credible comments
are likely to translate directly into influence in affecting the shape of the
final rule. Specifically, if each detailed and well-supported comment raises
a litigation risk, then the agency can be expected to make changes roughly
proportional to the total number of comments, rather than favoring the
comments of an underrepresented constituency. In his case study of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Professor Schmidt found
that formal comments were the most influential source of input precisely
because they posed immediate risks of litigation.8' Additionally, and in this
same vein, industry comments are likely to be more factually and
technically oriented given industry's specialized knowledge and
attentiveness to compliance-related details. These technical facts constitute
a particular soft spot for the agency in litigation, and agencies are
purported to be especially amenable to making changes in their final rules
based on comments that are technical in nature.82
4. Summagy
Individually, each of these opportunities for skews in the influence of
affected parties takes a toll on the resulting rule. Together they can act in
mutually reinforcing ways to lead to a process that can be badly
imbalanced, yet still follow every administrative process requirement to the
80. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 77, at 1384-86.
81. See Schmidt, supra note 667, at 80, 82, 86-87.
82. See, e.g., Field & Robb, supra note 55, at 10 (noting that industry counsel agree that
"[t]he arguments that stand the greatest chance of being listened to by the Agency are those
that address technical aspects of a proposed rule rather than the legal basis of that rule"); see
also id. at 50 (explaining that "the Agency is generally more receptive to [technical]
comments ... not only because [it] want[s] to appear reasonable and responsive to public
comments, but also because [its] willingness to refine a regulatory program ... should help
that program withstand judicial review"). Moreover, if industry has already had extensive
discussions with the agency to convince it to consider its material changes during the pre-
NPRM, its formal comments are likely to be aimed primarily at chipping away at the rule
on smaller details rather than radically reconfiguring the proposal. In contrast, the public
interest groups' primary concerns and comments may take on some basic framing decisions
fundamental to the development of the rule. To the extent that these groups' changes tend
toward this more "material" direction, they are more likely to receive a chilly reception from
the agency because they technically require the agency to promulgate a supplemental, or
second, proposed rule, which involves an additional notice-and-comment process. In terms
of the time involved, it may be quicker to reject these groups' significant comments and risk
being sued than to accept their changes and trigger notice and comment all over again.
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II. STUDY DESIGN
This Article assesses interest group participation and influence during
three stages of the rulemaking process for one set of highly technical rules
promulgated by EPA and predicts imbalances in interest engagement at
each stage. The hypotheses are provided below.
Statement of Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Agency contacts with affected parties during rule
development (pre-NPRM) will be extensive and will be dominated by
regulated parties.
Hypothesis 2: The formal comments lodged with the agency on a complex
rule will come predominantly from regulated industry, and the changes
made to the proposed rule in the final rule will track this imbalance and
generally favor industry.
Hypothesis 3: After rules are promulgated as final, interest group activity
will continue on a significant percentage of them and revisions will be made
to the rules that reflect these post-final negotiations. Regulated parties will
again dominate this interest group activity.
The hypotheses are tested by examining the rulemaling life cycle for
ninety air toxic emission standards (n=90), which constitute nearly all83 of
the rules promulgated by EPA to restrict the release of air toxins from
major sources. 84 These Hazardous Air Pollutants rules (HAPs rules) were
selected for several reasons. First, the HAPs rules are relatively typical
examples of pollution control standards promulgated by EPA. The
standards, like many of EPA's other pollution control standards, are
mandated by statute and promulgated under statutory deadlines.8 5 The
83. The exclusion of some rules became necessary because of limitations in EPA's
record keeping practices or because the rules diverged significantly from the others (i.e., they
were promulgated under two or more statutes rather than just § 112 of the Clean Air Act,
like medical waste incinerators). See Appendix for a more detailed discussion of these
exclusions.
84. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2006) (outlining emission standards); 40 C.F.R. Pt. 63
(1999) (discussing the ninety rules included in the Appendix sample).
85. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006) (prohibiting the point source
discharge of oil and other hazardous waste pollution without a permit that, in turn, is based
on the capabilities of the best available technology); Resource Conservation and Recovery
2011]
ADM1NISTA TIVE LA wREVIEW
rules also require EPA to base pollution control requirements on what it
determines to be the best available emission control methods, a mandate
similar to many other pollution control statutes. 86 Specifically, under § 112
of the Clean Air Act, EPA is required to survey currently available (or soon-
to-be available) pollution control technologies for classes and categories of
industry and to select the top performers in each industry category that
emit the lowest level of air toxins. 87 EPA then converts the pollution
reduction capabilities of these best performers into numerical emission
limits for each major industrial source of HAPs.88 These standards are the
primary, and often the exclusive, means for reducing public exposure to air
toxins.89 Each of the rules in our study set emissions limits for a different
segment of industry, so, for example, one rule sets emissions standards for
boat manufacturing, another for cellulose product manufacturing, and
another for coke ovens.90 While the rules obviously affect very different
types of industries, the rules are comparable insofar as each one of them
typically follows the same analytical process (e.g., definition of affected
industry, requirements for compliance, emission limitations, monitoring
requirements, etc.).
EPA's HAPs rules have several other attributes for this Article that go
beyond their representativeness as general pollution control standards.
Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6923-6925 (2006) (requiring transporters and treatment, storage,
and disposal units handling hazardous wastes to self-identify potential problem areas and
follow regulatory requirements).
86. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1321; 42 U.S.C. §§ 6923-6925.
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3) (2006) (requiring that emissions from existing plants
should meet at least "the average emission limitation achieved by the best performing 12
percent of the existing sources").
88. This step, which requires making assumptions about "average" industry pollution
loads and how well the selected technology reduces pollution, can be quite controversial.
EPA must become familiar with the capabilities of the nation's industries, the variety of
pollution control equipment available, and how this equipment actually works when
employed in the field. See D. Bruce La Pierre, Technolog-Forcing and Federal Environmental
Protection Statutes, 62 IowA L. REv. 771, 810-11 (1977) (specifying three steps in setting
technology-based standards: (1) categorizing industries; (2) identifying the contents of their
respective wastewaters; and (3) identifying the range of control technologies available); see
also Sanford E. Gaines, Decisionmaking Procedures at the Environmental Protection Agency, 62 IoWA
L. REV. 839, 853 (1977) (discussing questions regarding the effectiveness of pollution control
technologies under various plant ages, sizes, and manufacturing conditions).
89. See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Hazardous Air Pollutants, Migrating Hot Spots, and the
Prospect of Data-Driven Regulation of Complex Industrial Complexes, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1445 (2008)
(describing the pivotal role of air toxins in reducing health risks and the resultant
inadequacies in their enforcement).
90. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), EPA,
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/mactfnlalph.html (providing the table of complete HAPs
rules) (last visited Feb. 2, 2011).
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First, these rules were promulgated by EPA, an agency that is generally
regarded as resistant to traditional types of capture, such as revolving door
employment, gifts, bribes, and cozy relationships. 91 To the extent that the
rulemaking process does seem to tip in favor of industry, then, this
imbalance is more likely to be due to defects in administrative process
rather than peculiar vulnerabilities in individual agency staff.92
Additionally, EPA promulgated the selected HAPs from 1994 through
2009, making the records easily accessible and offering a chance for
comparison of two very different presidential administrations.
Two sources of information provide the bulk of the data nalyzed in this
study: the index of the rulemaking dockets and the significant changes
made to the proposed rule, as described in the final rule preamble. These
textual sources were coded into quantitative information using student
coders who categorized information in the docket-e.g., interest group
communication by type and date-with the resulting numerical data
entered into Excel and analyzed with Stata, SAS, and R. These two sets of
data are described in more detail below. Information was also collected
from a variety of sources on post-final rule activity.
A. Coding the Docket Index
The most straightforward component of the study involved collecting
information on the type and number of interest group contacts with the
agency throughout the rulemaking process. The EPA's docket index,
which is the record upon which the rule is reviewed by the courts, provided
the sole source of this information. In these lengthy docket indices, EPA
logs hundreds of contacts and communications from interest groups
occurring throughout the entire life cycle of the rule, including years before
the rule was published in the Federal Register as a proposal. 93 These docketed
records provide information on the nature of the contact (e.g., letter,
telefax, meeting), the affiliation of the party, and the date of the
communication. Law students trained in the coding protocol then
translated the interest group participation recorded in the dockets into
quantitative information using a relatively straightforward coding scheme.
91. Seesupra note 39.
92. Preliminary interviews with a handful of public interest and agency staff strengthen
the reliability of this presumption; we are considering conducting a more exhaustive set of
surveys that will provide solid documentation of this fact.
93. EPA is not required to docket communications prior to the publication of the
proposed rule. In the HAPs rules, however, EPA recorded extensive communications
which, although not complete, provide a useful quantitative measure for assessing interest
group participation. See supra note 83.
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The coding scheme itemizes, dates, and categorizes each interest group
communication with EPA. The Appendix discusses the methods in greater
detail.
B. Coding the Significant Changes in the Proposed Rule
The actual influence of interest groups in affecting the final rule was
measured by content-coding the final rule preambulatory discussion of the
most significant comments received on the proposed rule and the changes
the agency made in response. In these preambulatory discussions, EPA
often lists dozens and even hundreds, of significant comments and resultant
changes. Law student coders identified each of these significant comments
and agency responses and coded them with regard to whether the agency
subsequently weakened or strengthened the rule (i.e., eliminating
requirements weakens a rule, adding comments or more stringent
requirements strengthens a rule), as indicated in Figure 1. Each suggested
change was coded separately and categorized by the nature of the comment
(e.g., substantive, paperwork, compliance deadline). Measures of influence
are thus based on EPA's own characterization of the significant comments
and its response. 94 The Appendix discusses the methods in greater detail.
Type of Decline Decline Agree Agree to Can't
Response/Change weaken strengthen to strengthen tell
weaken
Figure 1: Measuring Influence by Tracking the Comments
and Their Fates
EPA's discussion of the significant comments and resultant changes
generally does not identify industry commenters by name, however. As a
result, changes that "weaken" the rule are simply assumed to stem from
industry, and changes that "strengthen" the rule are assumed to come from
public interest groups. Since there was a significant, direct correlation
between the number of industry comments and the number of changes
made to weaken the rule, the results appear to support the assumption. 95
While in some cases the changes made to a rule may be substantively
minor, even when added together, the coding scheme does provide some
indication of the tilt in the final rule with regard to the total number of
changes.
94. This study takes for granted that these characterizations are accurate, although in
future research we hope to test the validity of this assumption.
95. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
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C. Post-Final Rule Activiy
Finally, this Article traces interest group activity after the final rule is
published to determine whether additional changes are made under the
shadow of judicial review. EPA's entries in the Unified Agenda and its
discussions in the Federal Register preambles provided the primary source of
data to determine whether one or more interest groups ultimately
petitioned for reconsideration of the final rule, challenged the rule in court,
and whether the rule was revised after being promulgated as final and how
often. The Appendix discusses these methods in greater detail.
III. RESULTS
Professor Elliott observes that "[n]otice-and-comment rulemaking is to
public participation as Japanese Kabuki theatre is to human passions-a
highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way the essence of
something which in real life takes place in other venues." 96  Professor
Elliott, a former EPA General Counsel, recounts how much of EPA's
regulatory analysis is informed not by notice and comment but "from
informal meetings with trade associations and other constituency groups, to
roundtables, to floating 'trial balloons' in speeches or leaks to the trade
press." 97
The findings of this study underscore both the accuracy and the
importance of Professor Elliott's remarks. While notice and comment may
not exactly amount to window dressing, the results of this study reinforce
the possibility that a great deal of interest group influence occurs outside of
the glass box of notice and comment.
The findings also suggest that once one looks at the entire life cycle of
rulemakings, at least in this set of highly complex and technical pollution
control rules promulgated by EPA, one observes systematic evidence of
imbalance in interest group engagement and influence. In HAPs
rulemakings, these imbalances tilt strongly in favor of regulated industry,
resembling the type of "board room" politics that Gormley envisioned for
rules that were generally not central to public health and environmental
protection .98
96. Elliott, supra note 53, at 1492.
97. Id. at 1492-93.
98. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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Hypothesis 1: Agency contacts with affected parties during
rule development (pre-NPRM) will be extensive and will be
dominated by regulated parties.
In administrative law, the multiple benefits for interest groups to engage
in negotiations with the agency during rule development, coupled with the
legal incentives for the agency to "'get it right the first time,"' 99 coalesce to
create a rulemaking climate in which pre-NPRM contacts can be expected
to be quite extensive. The results from this study support these hypotheses,
as shown in Figure 2. The rulemaking dockets reveal extensive engagement
with outside stakeholders during the rule development stage. On average,
the agency engaged in 178 contacts with interest groups (including states)
during rule development-before publication of the proposed rule-for
each of the ninety rules. More than half of these contacts were informal
and were not in response to information requests. As discussed later, these
informal contacts alone are, on average, more than double the number of
comments received on the rule.
13 Mushry
0 PuNlIc ntemst
m Staie
Pre-NPRM Notce and Comment
Figure 2: Interest Group Participation (Total Contacts) at Pre-
NPRM and Notice-and-Comment Stages of Rulemaking
(The solid bars represent the mean number of contacts; the thin lines
represent the standard deviation on these means).
99. West, supra note 16, at 582 (quoting a senior attorney at the department level of a
federal agency).
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An equally important finding is that this pre-NPRM period was almost
completely monopolized by regulated parties. 100 Industry had, on average,
at least 170 times more informal communications docketed with EPA
during the pre-NPRM stage than public interest groups and more than ten
times the informal contacts with EPA as compared with state regulators.
Specifically, the data reveal extensive industry contacts made in the pre-
NPRM stage for all rules under study. Industry informal contacts during
the pre-NPRM stage averaged eighty-four per rule. This includes all forms
of communications (i.e., meetings, phone calls, letters, etc.). Another
eighty-six written communications per rule (on average) during the pre-
NPRM stage involved formal information requests that resulted in
additional correspondence between EPA and regulated parties. By
contrast, the average number of public interest contacts during the pre-
NPRM stage is 0.7 per rule, with about two-thirds of these contacts
consisting of meetings rather than correspondence. State regulators logged
nine contacts per rule on average during the pre-NPRM period. Figure 3
illustrates these disparities.
U-OlfYfl.OR
Other Information
Informal5J Wrte
Informal Written Communications Between
Communications Cmuiain eweInterest Groups and EPA
Figure 3: Interest Group Participation During Pre-NPRM by
Type of Communication
(M=Mean; SD=Standard Deviation; Max=maximum value within the
ninety rules). An additional 2% of communications came from regulated
governments.
100. See Figures 2 and 3. In our study, and despite the fact that EPA is not required to
log these contacts as a matter of law, EPA did record hundreds of these studies, contacts,
and other information as part of its administrative record. As a legal matter, this may be a
wise move. Because the rules are judged against the rulemaking record, evidence of
extensive industry communications should help buffer the agency against accusations of
sloppy or incomplete analysis, at least when the industry is the legal challenger. Discussions
with former EPA employees suggest that when available, these contact logs are not
substantially biased-that is, when EPA logged informal pre-NPRM contacts, they did so
without regard to the source of the contact (e.g., industry, public interest, state, etc.).
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The results provide one of the first, if not the only, quantitative
measures of interest group contacts occurring during the development of a
proposed rule by a federal agency. Available qualitative evidence reinforces
the finding of significant imbalances in interest group participation at this
stage. Based on more than forty interviews with EPA and stakeholders
involved in EPA rules, for example, Professor Coglianese concludes that
"[iln the rule development phase, industry groups tend to dominate
because of the information they can provide to the agency staff as they
write a rule.... Corporations and trade associations get involved in the
development of nearly every significant EPA rule."' 0 '
What remains to be understood-to the extent that this is a trend that
continues in other rulemaking areas-is why this imbalance in interest
group engagement is so dramatic. One explanation is that a type of
information symbiosis emerges between the agencies and the most
knowledgeable and resourceful groups, at least in technology-based rules.
The agency appreciates that the only way to get its rule through the process
is to work closely with its fiercest allies early in the rulemaking process.
Indeed, EPA's own training materials openly encourage these early
contacts with its adversaries. "[N]egotiation and consultation with outside
parties are an important part of the rulemaking process at EPA .... [This
contact] brings outside information and perspectives to the Agency's
decisions[,] ... builds support for the Agency's decisions[,] and increases
the overall efficiency of EPA's decision making process."' 10 2 Professor
Coglianese quotes an EPA official who further underscores the importance
of close relations with industry during the development of the proposed
rule:
We try to bring them in as early as possible on what we are required to do
and request their help very early on and usually this is appreciated because
that way they have input as opposed to EPA unilaterally going out and
looking at various textbooks and writing rules that are ridiculous because we
don't fully understand what the hell we are regulating. So it works out better
by working very closely with the people that we are going to regulate and we
do this in various ways[.] We meet with them, we have industry-agency
101. Coglianese, supra note 41, at 75. Professor Coglianese's dissertation is brimming
with illustrative quotations. Among them is a quote from an EPA official who praised
litigious trade groups for their diligence in assisting EPA, even after suing the agency for the
same rule that the official helped developed: The trade association "cooperate[d] with the
agency, bend[ing] over backwards to help us in any way that we wanted. All we had to do
was ask and they would do that. It was literally a pleasure working with those people." Id. at
191.
102. Id. at 48 (citing U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Fact Sheet 12, Regulation
Management Series (revised Feb. 1992)).
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workgroups that will meet together. 103
Industry also likely appreciates that its best shot at having a significant
influence is during the rule's formative stages. Legal counsel for industry
participants advise them to "[g] et involved during the preproposal phase of
an Agency rulemaking. That is when the regulation writers want reliable
technical information.., and are thus most receptive to comments from
interested persons."' 104 There are several accounts of industry not only
commenting, but actually drafting the proposed rule as part of these pre-
NPRM discussions. 105 For a variety of reasons, which include their more
limited knowledge of industry-based technical issues central to the
rulemaking, public interest groups might be expected to have a much
weaker participatory presence at the pre-NPRM stage. Indeed, unlike
industry, they may not even appreciate that policymaking work is underway
because they do not receive letters seeking more information. Perhaps
equally important, public interest groups may lack the resources to engage
in this time consuming process that produces few opportunities for credit-
taking, to the extent that their views prevail.
The results of this study lend support to the emerging view that
administrative law needs to broaden its current focus on interest group
engagement beyond the notice-and-comment and appeal processes. If the
law creates incentives for the agency to attempt to prepare an essentially
done deal at the proposed rule stage, then these incentives may have
perverse effects on ensuring open, transparent, and balanced interest group
engagement during the notice-and-comment process. 106 Yet, as discussed
103. Id. at 38-39.
104. Field & Robb, sufpra note 55, at 9.
105. See id. at 52 (crediting one attorney with pointing out the advantages of providing
draft language for the proposed rule and concluding that "whatever the Agency does not
take out [of your draft rule] reflects your thinking and has your perspective"). As an official
in a corporate office explained with respect to involvement with EPA on a rule:
I led an effort-which took about 9 months-to develop using our internal design
and operating practices for our [operations], to develop an actual regulation and a
preamble and it wound up being a 300-page document with lots of technical data to
submit to the agency before they even really started their regulatory process, as a way
to influence their thinking on what it ought to look like. And we carefully tied it to
the statutory mandate and documented all of the design standards and operating
procedures that we used-why they were important, where they were used, what the
benefits were-and put that in front of the agency well in advance of their process to
influence how they went about it. It had a tremendous impact.
Coglianese, supra note 41, at 47 (alteration in original).
106. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 856, 893-900 (2007) (criticizing courts for adding the requirement that
agencies go through a second notice-and-comment process when the final rule is not the
"logical outgrowth" of the proposed rule and discussing how this requirement impedes
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previously and with a few important exceptions, little attention has been
given to this potentially important pre-NPRM stage with respect to interest
group representation. 107 Instead, the bulk of scholarly attention, both
empirically and within the administrative law literature, seems focused
primarily on the notice-and-comment process. 108
Hypothesis 2: Formal comments lodged with the agency on
complex rules will come predominantly from regulated
industry, and the changes made to the proposed rule in the final
rule will track this imbalance and generally favor industry.
As a simple matter of economics, participating in highly technical and
complex rulemaking requires greater resources. These rules are therefore
likely to attract less balanced engagement because interest groups' time and
resources, particularly those advocating on behalf of the diffuse public, are
limited.10 9  The data support this hypothesis and reveal significant
imbalances in participation in the engagement of interest groups during the
notice-and-comment process. On average, industry comments (industry
plus industrial associations) comprised over 81% of the comments
submitted on the HAPs rules during the notice-and-comment period, as
shown in Figure 4 below. Industry, moreover, participated in all of the rules
at this important juncture in the rulemaking; public interest groups, by
contrast, participated in less than half (4 8 %) of the rules. When the public
interest groups did participate, moreover, they were badly outnumbered by
industry participants. The mean number of comments per rule filed by
agency adaptability to new information during the notice-and-comment period).
107. See, e.g., Balla, supra note 19, at 81-83 (providing some data on the extent of
informal contacts with the agency that are not solicited through formal channels); West,
supra note 19, at 70-72 (discussing opportunities for influence during pre-NPRM stage);
Furlong & Kerwin, supra note 19, 362-66.
108. All the empirical studies to date focus exclusively on the notice-and-comment
process as the touchstone for interest group engagement. See supra notes 39-45. See also
Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern
Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REv. 889 (2008).
109. Professor Neil Komesar observes that an individual's participation is based upon
the relative costs and benefits of that participation, a calculation that varies not only by issue
but by institution. When the costs of information are lowered and information becomes
more accessible, participation increases. Similarly, when the benefits to participation rise-
for example, through damage awards in tort claims-claimants' participation increases. See
NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 8 (1994). It is the combination of lower costs and higher
benefits that explains the comparative advantages of the tort system relative to the
regulatory system in providing improved access to needed information regarding health and
environmental protection.
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public interest groups across all rules was 2.4 (4%) as compared to a mean
number submitted by industry of thirty-five (81%) comments per rule. 110
U=U1S=422
Ma*= 279
~~U5..1 (St)= 6,TJ
Figure 4: Interest Group Participation During the Notice-and-
Comment Process
(M=Mean; SD=Standard Deviation; Max=maximum value within the 90
rules). An additional 7 % of comments came from regulated governments
and other/unknown groups.
Imbalances in interest group representation in the HAPs rules are
greater than identified in other studies. Professors Yackee and Yackee
found that for ten rules in each of four agencies, including EPA, business
interests submitted over 57% of comments, whereas nongovernmental
organizations submitted 22% and public interest groups submitted 6%.111
In his study of the twenty-five significant rules promulgated by EPA from
1989 to 1991, Professor Coglianese found that businesses participated in
96% of the rules; national environmental groups participated in 44%.112
Professor Coglianese does not report on the average number of comments
filed by each group.
The influence of interest groups was also measured during the notice-
and-comment period to determine whether EPA makes changes to the
proposed rule in ways that generally track the comment activity. 113 In
110. The mean number of comments filed per rule was thirty-nine, which appears to be
slightly less comment activity than Yackee and Yackee found for their low salience rules,
which averaged about forty-two comments per rule. See Yackee and Yackee, supra note 20,
at 131.
111. Seeid. at 133.
112. See Coglianese, supra note 41, at 73 tbl.2-2.
113. By contrast, there was no readily available benchmark to measure the agency's pre-
proposal before it was vetted through the range of interested parties. For example, during
the pre-NPRM stage interest groups appear to become involved well before the first draft of
2011]
ADMLISTRA7VE LA wREVIEW
general, one would predict that the pressures placed on agencies through
the threat of judicial review, triggered by comments, will translate into
influence, if not on a one-to-one basis, then at least in a way that suggests
that greater comments from one sector will lead to imbalanced influence in
the final rules. 114 Specifically, due to dominant industry participation
during the comment period of the HAPs rules, one would expect final rules,
on average, to be weakened, rather than strengthened in response to
comments. In this Article, and as previously discussed in the Methods
Section, this influence was measured by examining the changes made
between the proposed and the final rule and categorizing the change as
either weakening or strengthening the rule. "15
The findings generally support the hypothesis that comments lead to
changes, although there is not a one-to-one correspondence between
comments and changes; instead the correlation is more like one change per
every two issues raised by commenters. Specifically, on average each rule
involved twenty-two significant issues raised by the commenters in their
comments and EPA made changes in response to slightly more than half
(thirteen) of these comments and rejected the rest. Consistent with
dominant participation by industry, moreover, most of the significant
changes made to the rules (8 3 %) weakened them in some way, usually by
eliminating some requirement that EPA originally suggested in the
a proposed rule is crafted; thus it is impossible to know what the agency may have had in
mind before interest group participation. As discussed later, an opposite problem afflicts
what might transpire as a result of negotiations after a rule is final. While changes to a final
rule can be compared pre- and post-negotiation, existing empirical literature indicates that
the results of these negotiations may take many forms and that actual changes to the text of
the rule may not begin to capture the result of these negotiations.
114. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
223, 225 (2001) (underscoring how uncertainty in judicial review, coupled with adversarial
processes, leads to counterproductive delays and skews in the resulting influence and power
of different groups affected by a rulemaking); JERRY L. MAsHAw, GREED, CHAOS, AND
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAw 165 (1997) (stating that
"most seem to argue that the real impediment created by judicial review is uncertainty" in
how courts will analyze the rule).
115. We were not able to determine reliably whether the changes were "big" or "little"
using this method, however; thus, there is still the distinct possibility that even if there is
some indication of interest group impacts on the proposed rule as a result of comments,
whether these impacts are substantively important is unclear and has been questioned by
others. See, e.g., West, supra note 16, at 579 (discussing how some scholars believe that
changes made to the proposed rule tend to be made "at the margins" and rarely go to the
heart of the policy). The only indication that they might be is that EPA identified the
changes as "significant"; however, this may be a relative term that selects out the most
important changes relative to the rest and does not indicate objectively that the changes are
indeed important.
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proposed rule. 116
This power in numbers is further reinforced by the finding that the
number of changes weakening the rule steadily increased as the number of
industry comments increased, with a correlation coefficient of 0.56 that is
significant at the 0.01 level,' 7 shown in Figure 5 below. This provides yet
another reinforcing perspective on how comments translate into influence,
at least from the vantage point of industry. The data also suggest that there
is effectively no stopping point on the number of changes that can be made
to a rule; it depends on the number of issues commenters raise in their
comments.
Industry Comments vs. Changes Made to Weaken Rule
cJ
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Figure 5
116. Industry enjoyed more affirmative changes relative to the public interest for 870/ of
the rules. Industry enjoyed more total favorable changes (both rejecting comments to make
the standard stronger and accepting changes to make it weaker) relative to industry for 8 0%
of the rules.
Intercoder reliability scores for some of these variables were quite weak and well
below 0.75. See Appendix (detailing how reliability was measured). Reliability scores on
public interest affirmative changes, the weakest of all, bottomed out at 0.36, a malady we
attribute in part to the small numbers for this category of events. We will continue to
examine the data to determine whether recoding can eliminate errors, whether revised
protocol could avoid some of the reliability problems without losing validity of the data, or
whether these reliability scores are generally the best that can be done with such a complex
coding task, particularly when the units are small and the chance for even one unit
variations can cause the reliability score to drop quite low.
117. There was a similarly significant positive correlation between the number of
changes made in favor of industry and the number of public interest group comments, a
finding that we attribute to the fact that as public interest comments increase, industry
comments (and changes) also increase proportionately.
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Less expected was the finding illustrated in Figure 6, that while EPA
rejected about one-third of the comments intended to weaken the rule, it
rejected more than half of the comments to strengthen the rule. Thus, the
comments to strengthen the rule were not only fewer in number, but were
less successful as compared with their counterparts striving to weaken the
rule. This could be due to a number of factors. Perhaps the public interest
group comments were more ambitious and demanded material changes to
the rule. Or perhaps the agency views changes weakening a rule-which
generally subtract from the rule-as less vulnerable to arguments that
"material changes" were made as compared with comments that demand
adjustments or additions to the text. 118 These and other possibilities are
ripe for further testing.
0-
M Weakening
M Stengtening
Changes Rejection of Conmments
Figure 6: Comparison of Apparent Influence of Public Interest
and Industry Interest Groups in Convincing EPA to Weaken or
Strengthen the Proposed Rule' 19
(The solid bars represent the mean number of changes in each category; the
thin lines represent the standard deviation on these means).
118. See West, supra note 16, at 581 ("One possible implication of the need to provide
adequate notice is a bias in favor of subtractive changes in proposed rules. Deletions in
response to public comment thus are not subject to the criticism that they have caught
stakeholders by surprise.").
119. Since the reliability of some of this data are low, these numbers, while statistically
significant in terms of finding some difference, should be interpreted cautiously with respect
to the absolute values.
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Hypothesis 3: After rules are promulgated as final, interest
group activity will continue on a significant percentage of them
and revisions will be made to the rules that reflect these post-
final negotiations. Regulated parties will again dominate this
interest group activity.
Although administrative law scholarship has focused on the importance
of the courts in reversing or remanding rules, surprisingly little attention has
been given to what might be an even more important rulemaking
influence-negotiations that occur on the courthouse steps after a rule is
promulgated as final. Several scholars have observed that filing petitions
and even appeals in court are relatively low cost measures for interest
groups who have become deeply invested in the rulemakings. This is
particularly true for regulated parties who also may enjoy implementation
delays that postpone compliance costs while the appeals or petitions are
being resolved.' 20 At the same time, there is likely to be some negotiating
room during the post-rule stage for interest groups who did not prevail on
all of their comments. As a result, rules may not be set in stone when
published as final, but many will continue to undergo more changes and
revisions, some of which may be largely beyond the APA's reach.
In order to gain some sense of what occurs during the post-final rule
stage, this study consulted several sources of data.121 First, evidence was
120. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale
for Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DuKE LJ. 729, 737-38 (observing that "[b]ecause
judicial review 'delay[s] the implementation of OSHA standards by an average of two
years,' a company or trade association could save its industry $320,000 by filing an appeal,
assuming an eight percent annual interest rate .... [Thus a trade] association could afford
legal fees of up to $640 an hour and still save its members money compared to the costs of
immediate compliance with the OSHA standard" (second alteration in original) (footnote
omitted)); Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm, and the
EPA in the Courts of Appeals during the 1990s, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10371, 10377 (2001)
(explaining that "petitioners may add statutory interpretation challenges to cases brought on
other grounds because the marginal costs of bringing a statutory challenge are relatively
small").
12 1. Because these post-final rule communications are again outside of the docket
recording requirements and thus will be recorded at the whim of the agency, we expect the
public records to be incomplete. Yet we lack any mechanism to determine just how
incomplete. The same may be true for EPA's decision to publish changes resulting from
petitions for reconsideration in the Unified Agenda, particularly if the changes take the form of
minor amendments or alterations to guidance documents.
First, we consider whether and the extent to which post-final rule revisions actually
take place in practice. Conveniently, EPA lists every published revision to each of the HAPs
rules-a task that substantially streamlines data collection. See Appendix. This data does
not tell us whether the revisions were triggered by interest groups or initiated spontaneously
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collected on whether and to what extent rules are being revised after
publication of the final rule. On this score, the data summarized in Table 1
below reveal a relatively high rate of revision activity; about 70% of all of
the HAPs rules were revised at least once. More specifically and excluding
the thirty percent of rules with no revisions, HAPs rules, on average,
underwent about five revisions each since their promulgation in the 1990s
or 2000s, which is, on average, one revision every other year. Most of these
revisions do not involve notice and comment and about 13% of the
revisions are entitled "stay," "exemption," or "exception" which appear-
by their title-to favor industry.
Mean Standard Maximum
Deviation
Total number of 5.0 10.1 76
revisions/rule
Major revision as formal 1.8 3.5 24
rulemaking, with notice-
and-comment
Technical amendment or 2.5 4.2 28
clarification without
notice-and-comment
Revision called a "stay, .7 3.1 24
exemption, or extension",
usually occurring without
notice-and-comment
Number of revisions/year .6 .9 5.75
Table 1: Revision Activity for Rules that Involved at Least One
Revision (n=63)
Information on whom or what triggers these revisions is more difficult to
determine.1 22 Drawing primarily from the Unified Agenda, it appears that
by the agency, however. The data are also limited to changes that resulted in published
revisions in the Federal Register. Changes that are not published, i.e., amendments to
interpretive guidance or enforcement guidelines, are thus not included in this data set even
though the literature suggests that this is another common route that agencies use to amend
rulemakings. See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 67, at 79 (discussing the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration's settlement with one party, which involved altering its enforcement
guidance).
122. This information comes from two public sources of information: EPA's log of
projects published in the Unified Agenda in the Federal Register and petitions logged into the
docket index after promulgation of a final rule. This data, particularly when combined with
targeted searches in the final rule preambles, allowed us to identify the filing party for all of
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twenty-two of all of the HAPs rules (or 22% of our dataset) involved
petitions for reconsideration or suits for judicial review. See Table 2. The
public interest and industry were almost in equipoise by the time petitions
for reconsideration and appeals were filed, although industry still enjoyed a
slight edge at this stage of the rulemaking.
Number of rules Filed by Filed by Filed
for which a industry public jointly
petition/litigation interest
was filed groups
Petitions for 8 4 1 3
Reconsideration
that did not
result in
litigation
Judicial appeals 12 5 3 4
(some of which
settled) as
recorded in the
Unified Agenda
and Westlaw
combined
Total filings 20 9 4 7
post-final rule
Table 2: Petitions and Challenges Filed by Interest Groups
Against HAPs Rules
the petitions and judicial appeals noted in these two sources of data. Yet both databases are
probably incomplete in ways that are likely to lead to underreporting, and perhaps
significant underreporting. This is because EPA records items in the Unified Agenda only
when they lead to final decisions generally taking the form of formal rulemakings. For
petitions or litigation that do not trigger published rule revisions (i.e., a nonmeritorious
petition or a settlement that leads to changes in EPA's guidance that does not alter the rule
itself), the changes seem unlikely to be noted in the Unified Agenda. Further, even when there
are final decisions or rules that result from petitions or litigations, we do not know whether
EPA consistently reports these revisions in its Unified Agenda filings, particularly when the
revisions are minor. Finally, the Unified Agenda looks ahead to what EPA plans to do. If a
settlement and rule revision occurs soon after a promulgated rule, it may not be mentioned
as a future project.
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The findings in this Article are thus consistent with Professor
Coglianese's observation of important post-final rule interest group activity.
While post-final rule activity seemed relatively strong in our dataset-
constituting more than 20% of the rules-Coglianese observed almost
double this activity in his subset of significant hazardous waste rules.
Specifically, Coglianese observed that 44 % of the rules in his dataset ended
with at least one petition seeking reconsideration or judicial review. 23
About half of these cases settled, and most of those settlements involved
only regulated industry. The other half of the petitioned rules proceeded to
litigation. 124 The greater post-final rule activity observed by Coglianese
might have occurred because he focused only on significant rules (although
only 25% of the significant rules in our dataset resulted in petitions for
reconsideration or litigation). It also could be because Professor
Coglianese's databases on post-final rule activity were more complete than
our two sources of information on filing activity. 125 When combined with
Professor Coglianese's study, our findings suggest that more attention needs
to be directed toward this potentially important, but generally ignored
period of interest group engagement, as well as at the pre-NPRM stage.
IV. ADDITIONAL FINDINGS
In this Section, we take a step back and, with the help of additional
exploratory data, probe deeper into several questions raised by the findings,
while also attempting to place the findings within a larger administrative
context.
A. Where are the Public Interest Groups?
As noted in the introduction, the findings of limited public interest group
engagement in the development of HAPs rules do not comport with
conventional wisdom. 126 While public interest groups may not be able to
participate in every rule, one would not expect them to be so badly
outnumbered and even absent from rulemakings that have important
implications for public health.
As it turns out, however, public interest groups did play a forceful role in
most of EPA's HAPs rules, but this role occurred much earlier in the
process and only with regard to the timeline, not the substance, of the
rulemakings. The early activity of public interest groups was not caught by
123. Coglianese, supra note 41, at 95.
124. Id. at 141-42, 155.
125. See infra Appendix (explaining in greater depth).
126. See supra Part I (revealing that public interest group engagement in the development
of HAPs rules is limited).
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our initial hypotheses since these hypotheses focus exclusively on interest
group engagement and influence in the substance of the rulemalings and
not on the timing of rule promulgation.
Specifically, the Unified Agenda data 127 reveal that 73% of the HAPs rules
(sixty-six rules) in our study were promulgated under court order resulting
from deadline suits filed in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. 128 Although
references to judicially enforced deadlines do not reference public interest
groups as the litigant, we expect, based on other commentary and
observations, that these cases are brought predominantly, and likely
exclusively, by public interest groups. 129
Efforts by public interest groups to engage vigorously in this early phase
of the HAPs rulemakings make good strategic sense. Until the 1990
amendments to the Clean Air Act were passed, air toxics from large
stationary sources were effectively unregulated. 130  Therefore, the
promulgation of any standards reducing toxic pollutants provides a marked
improvement over the status quo. An important way to keep EPA on track
is the filing of deadline suits that force EPA to promulgate these standards
roughly on time. Beyond the public health benefits of these cases, deadline
suits can be filed with almost no investment of time or effort and almost
always lead to success. The only facts in contention, moreover, are whether
there is a statutory deadline for a rule and whether the agency has missed
that deadline. 131 Equally beneficial, these lawsuits can provide positive
publicity and media attention for public interest groups.
The engagement of public interest groups in this early but important
stage of the HAPs rulemaking process, demonstrated in Figure 7 also
provides a broader view of interest group activity through the rulemaking
life cycle. Disaggregating the rulemaking process into four distinct stages
also partly supports those political scientists and legal academics who
contend that pluralism is alive and well.132 At the same time, by breaking
down the opportunities for interest group engagement into the distinct
127. See infra Appendix (discussing the data from the Unifed Agenda in greater depth).
128. In the Clean Air Act, Congress set a strict timetable for when EPA is required to
complete various groups of HAPs standards; deadline suits consist of litigation, almost
always filed by environmental groups, which seek to hold EPA to this statutory schedule See
42 U.S.C. § 7412(e) (2006) (establishing schedule for standards and review).
129. We will verify this in the course of completing this study. See Coglianese, supra note
41, at 41-42 (discussing how deadline suits tend to be brought by public interest groups).
130. See, e.g., U.S. CONG. OFFICE TECH. AsSESSM'T, IDENTIFYING AND REGULATING
CARCINOGENS: BACKGROUND PAPER, 141-42 (1987) (stating that the performance
standards were delayed for fourteen months due to OMB).
131. See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 999-1000 (2006) (describing the features of deadline suits).
132. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
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stages, Figure 7 reveals the much more limited role of public interest groups
in shaping the substance of most of the rules, at least in the HAPs
rulemakings.
Timeline of Participation8
2 N'"
0 J
Deadline Suits Pre-NPRM Contact;s Nkte & Comuinit Post-fint RuleTime Period
Inusr Public Interest
Figure 7: Participation in Each Stage of the Rulemaking Life
Cycle by Number of Rules
Indeed, if this pattern of interest group activity turns out to be relatively
typical of many EPA or other public health rulemakings (i.e., public interest
groups are heavily involved in filing deadline suits and then back out of
most of the substantive features of rulemakings until the end of the process),
then involvement by public interest groups could actually lead to a
somewhat perverse effect on the stringency of the resultant standards. 133
Given that the standard-setting is highly complex and technical, the fact
that it also must be done in a relatively short time frame, often without
vigorous adversarial presence by public representatives, may mean that the
agency is even more dependent on regulated parties for information to get
the rule promulgated on time. So, if the rulemakings are too hurried, they
may be done more like a complex contractual negotiation between
knowledgeable parties-here, regulated industry and EPA-rather than as
a transparent deliberation amenable to vigorous public interest oversight.
133. See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-
MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 248-49 (4th ed. 1997) (noting
that the best manner to address organizational problems is to study the system that makes
the decisions).
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B. Participatoy Predictors
Beneath the means and ranges, there is considerable variation in the
extent to which interest groups participate in any given rule. In this
Section, we explore possible connections within the data that serve as
predictors for when an interest group will participate in a rule, or at least
participate more vigorously or in higher numbers.
1. Industry Engagement and the Economic Costs of Rulemakings
Industry engagement is strong across all rules, yet one would expect that
the cost a rule imposes on industry would be a useful predictor of the level
of industry activity: the higher the cost, the higher the level of industry
engagement at all stages of the rulemaking life cycle. While it was not
feasible to identify the costs imposed on industry for each rule individually
(these data may not be available), the rules could be divided into two
categories: major rules where the costs to society exceed $100 million
annually; and rules that are not considered economically significant. We
used negative binomial regression to compare participation during notice
and comment, and pre-NPRM activity for industry, public interest, and
states for economically significant versus economically nonsignificant rules.
There was significantly greater participation (99% confidence) by both
industry and states during the notice-and-comment process for
economically significant rules as compared to rules that were not deemed
significant.' 34  Public interest group engagement in the notice-and-
comment process, by contrast, was not affected by whether the rule was
economically significant. During the pre-NPRM process, there were no
statistically significant differences in participation activity between
economically significant and nonsignificant rules for any of these three
categories of interested parties.
2. Public Interest Group Engagement and Newsworthiness
Possible predictors of public interest group engagement are either the
litigation potential or the newsworthy features of a rule. Since the litigation
potential is difficult to assess ex ante, we focused on newsworthiness as a
possible, simple predictor of public interest group participation.
Specifically, we considered whether a correlation arises between the
number of news hits for a rule and the level of public interest group activity.
While this includes news that followed public interest group activity, rather
than just news articles that preceded it, this measurement at least gives a
134. For industry (X2(1) = 12.10,p < .001) and for states (X2(1) = 14.98,p < .001).
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general indication of whether public interest activity and newsworthiness go
hand in hand.
We tested for this possible predictor by collecting all the major news
coverage of individual HAPs rules by industry category over the entire
period of EPA's rulemaking (1990 to the present). 3 5 Of this coverage, only
twelve individual rules from the HAPs dataset (n=90) were covered in the
major newspapers, 136 and there were only thirty-two articles on these twelve
individual rules over the nineteen years of regulatory activity. 137 The
difference in public interest comment activity between rules with media hits
versus those that did not receive this coverage was in fact statistically
significant at the 9 9 % confidence level.138 For rules covered in the major
media, there was an average of 9.73 (SD=22.8) comments from public
interest group participation per rule versus 1.35 (SD=2.91) for rules not
covered in major newspapers. Most (about 6 0%) of this news attention was
generated after the comment period had closed and in a number of cases
after the rule was published as final. This time sequence makes the
comment activity even more interesting as a predictor of media attention
since it suggests that air toxic standards are much less newsworthy or salient
(even for economically significant rules) when public interest groups are not
vigorously engaged in the notice-and-comment process.
3. Interest Group Participation and the Chief Executive
One would also expect the identity of the Chief Executive to have some
impact on interest group engagement and influence, particularly given the
ideological differences between Presidents Bill Clinton and George W.
Bush, the only two presidents who presided over promulgation of the HAPs
rules. We are testing these differences more thoroughly in a separate
study.139 Preliminarily, however, the results do not show many significant
135. See infra Appendix (providing for a more detailed discussion of this search of major
papers in LexisNexis).
136. Our study covers only the HAPs rules in 40 C.F.R. Part 63. There are a few other
rules, as mentioned in the methods section, such as rules limiting toxic emissions from the
incineration of hazardous and solid waste, and from the removal of asbestos. These rules
received media coverage too, but are not included in the totals for source-specific Part 63
HAPs rules.
137. This fight news coverage of individual HAPs rules stands in contrast to the 485
more general articles over this same time period documenting problems or sources of
innovation with regard to air toxins emitted from large stationary sources.
138. A negative binomial regression model was used to compare public interest group
participation counts, which revealed a significant difference (X2(l) = 12.05,p < .001).
139. See generaly Katherine Barnes, Wendy Wagner & Lisa Peters, Presidential Politics
meets Regulatory Complexity: An Empirical Study of EPA's Hazardous Air Pollutant Rules
Under Clinton and Bush II (July 16, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1641551.
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differences between administrations with respect to either the balance in
interest group engagement or influence at key stages of the rulemaking life
cycle. Indeed, if anything, President Clinton was more amenable to pre-
NPRM contacts with all groups, including industry. EPA under his watch
was also more inclined to weaken rules based on industry comments than
the George W. Bush EPA.
4. The Role of the States
Although the states were treated as a single unit in this study, they may
have diverged considerably in their advocacy positions in the HAPs rules.'
40
Given their relatively high level of engagement throughout the process,
determining the nature and significance of the varying state roles is
important. Recall that states outnumbered public interest groups during
both the pre-NPRM and notice-and-comment process by almost two to
one.14 1 Given this higher rate of activity, if states are serving predominantly
as public interest advocates, then this alters the analysis to the extent that it
suggests a more formidable public interest presence than is revealed by
considering public interest group engagement, standing alone.1
42
In an effort to gain preliminary insight into the advocacy positions taken
by the states, we coded the text of the state comments filed for thirty-five
rules in our dataset-this is nearly half of the rules (seventy-two) that
triggered state comment. In their comments, the predominant role played
by the states is to advocate on behalf of greater protection in EPA's HAPs
rules, at least for those rules where the states actually staked out a clear
position. This is not always the case, however. As shown in Figure 8, in
most rules the states took diverse positions: some states advocated for
greater protections while other states advocated for lesser protections. We
intend to conduct further research on the role of the states to better
understand these dynamics.
140. To our knowledge, none of the empirical studies of interest group participation in
administrative law clear up this confusion regarding the states' multiple roles in public health
rulemakings. Rather, they count states as "states" without discussing what that means in the
constellation of interest group pressures. See Coglianese, supra note 41, at 70 (listing states as
a unit of study); Yackee, supra note 20, at 132.
141. Specifically, the mean number of state comments on the 35 rules in our subsample
was five. For pre-NPRM involvement, the mean number of contacts between EPA and the
states was nine, although it reached a maximum of seventy-seven contacts during the rule
development stage.
142. See, e.g., Paul A. Sabatier, An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and
the Role of Poliy-Oriented Learning Therein, 21 POL'Y SCI. 129, 139 (1988) (discussing the types of
advocacy coalitions that form during the policymaling process).
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Figure 8: Various Positions Taken by the States in Their
Comments
V. THE STORY EMERGING FROM THE DATA AND THE UNCERTAIN
ENDING
The data and accompanying analysis illuminate some of the shadiest
areas of rulemaking, but it seems to raise at least as many questions as it
answers. In this last Part, we recount the story that we believe emerges
from the data and highlight the uncertain implications of these findings.
A. The Story from the Data
Because the previous two Sections focus only on our hypotheses, it
necessarily leaves out some of the unexpected discoveries that inevitably
emerge from assembling the data. This Section draws from both these
qualitative and quantitative findings to offer a fuller account of EPA's HAPs
rulemaking process.
Under § 112 of the Clean Air Act, Congress directs EPA to promulgate a
continuous stream of over 100 toxic air emissions rules in less than a
decade, a timeframe that environmentalists reinforce through deadline suits
and successful judicial orders. 14 3 Congress also provides relatively specific
directions on the criteria EPA must use to promulgate these rules;
specifically, in setting HAPs standards Congress instructs EPA to identify
143. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e) (2006).
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the best performing industries, including those that used nontechnological
controls such as fuel-switching, and determine their achievable level of
emissions of air toxics. 144 EPA must also identify the effectiveness and costs
of the various control options to ensure they are feasible. 145 For example, if
some of the raw materials can be substituted in ways that reduce toxic air
emissions, EPA may want to investigate whether this input switching can be
done in practice within an industry that might not have unlimited choices
for input substitution. 1 6
In working through this daunting assignment for each of the 100-plus
categories of industry, EPA typically relies initially on the available
literature on pollution control technologies, which it supplements with
commissioned background documents prepared by contractors (on average,
each rule involved more than twenty commissioned contractor studies). 147
Quite early in the rulemaking life cycle-less than four years, on average,
before publication of the proposed rule-EPA also begins requesting
technical information from the regulated parties. EPA does this in part
through formal information requests, which average eighty-six formal
interactions between industry and EPA. The agency and regulated parties
also begin to engage in a range of informal communications, which include
not only letters and faxes, but also live meetings, telephone conversations,
and teleconferences. The informal contacts with industry comprise another
eighty-four communications per rule on average during the rule
development process. Most of these communications involve written
letters, although about one-third of the communications consist of phone
calls and meetings. For written communications, EPA actually initiates
more than one-third of the informal contacts with regulated parties; the rest
of the informal communications are initiated by the regulated parties. In
some cases, EPA also solicits feedback and critiques of its proposed rules
from these same regulated parties before the proposed rule is published. 148
144. See id. § 7412(d)(2); see also Sierra Club v. EPA, 479 F.3d 875, 881, 883 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (analyzing EPA actions in the context of EPA legislative mandate).
145. See42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2).
146. See id.; see also Sierra Club, 479 F.3d at 883 (describing the statutory prescription for
EPA to look at the feasibility of complying with regulations through various means).
147. We recorded the presence of contractors only at the initial stages of preparing
documents, but as a qualitative matter it was evident that their presence was continuous
throughout the rules. EPA contractors would routinely serve as the contact for
communications with industry, attend meetings, field phone calls, and provide the response
to comments or at least to produce a first draft. Indeed, in some rules it appears that the
contractor engaged in far more discussions with interest groups than did EPA staff. The role
ofcontractors in rulemakings is a rich empirical area that we leave for future research.
148. See, e.g., Field & Robb, supra note 55, at 10 (discussing industry's role in drafting
proposed rules); see also Coglianese, supra note 41, at 47-49 (commenting on industy's role in
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Regulated parties are not the only group that communicates with the
agency during rule development. The states were somewhat involved in
this process, albeit roughly ten times less often than EPA's informal
communications with regulated parties. 149 Moreover, in some of the
dockets, the states provided actual permits and conditions they had
imposed on industry. This information provided EPA with a more
comprehensive basis for evaluating the capabilities of the pollution control
technologies that were already in operation in some states. Least engaged
during this pre-NPRM stage were the public interest groups, who averaged
approximately 0.7 communications per rule.
The agency published a proposed rule a little less than four years, on
average, after initiating the rulemaking. 150 Immediately upon publication,
the rule was open for notice and comment, a process that typically lasted
sixty to ninety days, but in some cases extended for months. During this
notice-and-comment process, the agency continued to hear from these
same interest groups. Public interest groups made a stronger appearance as
compared with their pre-NPRM silence: public interest groups accounted
for about 4 % of all the comments filed with the agency; regulated parties
accounted for about 81%. The agency received on average a total of
approximately forty-three comments per rule. Late comments were also
filed. About 11. 4 % of the comments were late and more of these late
comments came from public interest groups (19% of public interest
comments were late as compared to 9.5% of industry comments). In
cataloging these comments, the agency typically relies on contractors.
Their reports, which are often more than 100 pages in length, itemize the
comments by issue and, in rare cases, by commenter and provide the
agency's response to each comment. 151 In a shorter section in the Federal
the drafting process).
149. EPA also engaged with governments when they acted as regulated parties, although
this was relatively rare and occurred only for a few rules, with an average across rules of 0.3
total communications with governments as regulated parties during the pre-NPRM process.
150. In coding the docket indices, coders identified the date of the first substantive
document logged into the docket. To calculate the time period over which EPA developed
its rulemaking proposal, we subtracted this date from the date that EPA published the
proposed rule. The mean period for the ninety HAPs rules was about four years. The
considerable time spent during rule development-more than twice the time spent that was
dedicated to responding to comments--suggests that empirical tests for ossification will need
to include this early period in the rulemaking life cycle. To date, the tests of ossification
appear to focus only on the agency's response to comments. It is also not clear whether the
rules that are tested include rules, like HAPs, that are under statutory and judicial deadlines.
In those cases, of course, ossification is much less likely.
151. For a sample of one of these documents, see, e.g., Summary of Comments and
Responses on Proposed National Emission Standards for Automobile and Light-Duty Truck
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Register, EPA summarizes the highlights of the "significant" comments and
provides its responses-including identifying resultant changes made in
response to the comments. This discussion of the agency's response to
significant comments appearing in the Federal Register preamble is, on
average, about eight pages long.
EPA usually takes, on average, about 1.5 years to produce a final rule
after publication of the proposed rule. The final rules were, on average,
thirty-nine pages in the Federal Register. About 43% of the rules were
considered major, resulting in greater than $100 million in annual costs to
society. These rules required cost-benefit analyses and were cleared
through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Only 6% of the
rules triggered small business protections.
In the final rule, EPA makes, on average, about thirteen "significant"
(EPA's characterization) changes to the proposed rule as a result of the
comments. This constitutes about a 58% acceptance rate for the most
significant comments, which average approximately twenty-two issues per
rule. In fact, the number of industry comments correlates directly with the
number of changes weakening the rule, averaging about one change
weakening the rule for every two industry comments received. Industry
also appears to enjoy a slight edge over the public interest advocates with
respect to EPA's acceptance of their comments: more than 82% of the
changes made by EPA in response to comments weakened the rules in
some way, and EPA tended to reject more of the comments advocating
strengthening the rule than it did weakening the rule.
EPA's response to significant comments provides a general indication of
how the notice-and-comment process affects a rule's development, but it
leaves unanswered several major questions. First, the data do not give
much indication of the significance of the changes that EPA makes. Some
scholars maintain that most of the changes made during the final rule are
minor and relatively insignificant. 152  Our data do not speak to this
question. The data do indicate that in most cases the changes involved
more than compliance extensions or paperwork requirements (these
comprise less than 2 0% of the changes). And while it is worth noting that
EPA itself labels these changes as "significant," our methods could not
distinguish between changes that appear relatively "modest"-i.e.,
providing industry with more flexibility in how to meet a particular
emission reduction--and those that seem significant-i.e., providing a new
exemption that allows major industries to escape compliance requirements
Surface Coating, EPA (Feb. 2004), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/auto/
autoresptocomment.pdf.
152. See, e.g., Golden, supra note 40, at 259; West, supra note 16, at 580-81.
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under the statute. Second, the data do not suggest why EPA rejects or
accepts comments seeking changes. It seems likely that in some cases the
commenters request changes that are not desirable from a political
perspective. In other cases, the commenters may be requesting changes
that are not legally credible, and thus, can be brushed aside. Or perhaps
some comments necessitate material changes to the proposed rule that,
from the agency's perspective, are not worth the risk of legal challenge. To
actually discriminate among these possibilities will require more extensive
coding and data collection.
Final rule promulgation does not mark the end of the rule's life cycle, at
least for the majority of HAPs rules. At least 22% of the rules resulted in
petitions for reconsideration and 13% percent involved appeals to court
that were lengthy enough to make the agency believe rule delays or changes
were likely, because these appeals were recorded as events in the agency's
Unified Agenda. Additionally, 70% of the HAPs rules were revised at least
once; and there were on average four revisions for each of these revised
rules. Interest group petitions may explain some of this revision activity,
but for at least half of the rules that were revised one or more times there is
no evidence of petitions or litigation. Thus, some of the revisions may be
done by the agency primarily to adjust the rule to changes in information
or technical details; other revisions could result from political pressure on
the agency. Again, additional data collection is warranted.
In contrast to the earlier stages of the rulemaking life cycle, interest
group activity appears more evenly balanced during the post-final stage of
rulemaking. Industry petitions for reconsideration or litigation were only
slightly higher than public interest group petitions. By the time the rule was
actually appealed to court and resulted in a judgment, the balance tipped to
yield an almost level playing field between industry and public interest
groups, with the former enjoying only a slight edge in terms of the recorded
notices of appeal. 153
In sum, once one looks at the entire life cycle of rulemakings, at least in
this set of highly complex and technical pollution control rules promulgated
by EPA, there are significant opportunities for participation and influence
by interest groups, of which notice and comment is only a part, and
perhaps a small part. Our research also suggests that at least in the case of
HAPs, much of this added engagement tends to be badly imbalanced at the
pre-NPRM stage, although it levels out for a small subset of rules after
promulgation of the final rule.
153. The litigation history of these HAPs rules is the subject of an ongoing project and
will be developed in future work.
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B. The Uncertain Ending
Regrettably, while imbalanced engagement and influence is occurring in
the HAPs rulemakings, this does not actually tell us whether this imbalance
has a meaningful impact on the substance of the final rules. This Section
considers arguments about why imbalances may not affect the substance of
the final rules in a meaningful way and finds each of them incomplete. At
this point, the available evidence does not rule out the possibility that
imbalances in interest group engagement and influence may significantly
impact the substance of the final rules.
1. Anticipating Industg Pressure by Issuing a Super-Stringent Early Proposal?
One possible way that imbalanced engagement may not matter is if the
agency anticipates an onslaught of industry opposition during the
rulemaking life cycle and develops an early proposed rule that is twice as
stringent in order to meet industry halfway. In this view, while the process
may be skewed in representation, it would not ultimately affect the
substance of the final rule because of the agency's own mediating role in
representing the public interest against the industry barrage. To directly
test this hypothesis, we would need access to the agency's earliest proposal.
Nevertheless, based on indirect evidence, it seems unlikely that the
agency will ultimately be able to anticipate and guard against imbalanced
industry engagement in ways that adequately protect the public interest.
First, the notion that the agency can begin with an overly ambitious rule in
terms of advancing the goal of health protection, knowing that it will get
whittled to half as it goes through the rulemaking, does not describe how
the rulemaking process works in practice or the incentives the agency face
as a result of judicial review. Courts do not review rules based on whether
the agency splits the difference between the litigious groups and the public
interest; each objection is reviewed on its own terms. If the agency provides
a reasonable response to an objection or request for change (recall that for
rules, there were approximately twenty-two requests for change, on
average), the agency's rule is safe. If not, it is at risk of remand. The fact
that the agency's rule in the aggregate does a good job of accommodating
all interest group concerns is not before the court. The court instead
reviews only those specific objections a litigating party wishes to raise in
challenging a final rule and it expects a reasonable response from the
agency on each contested issue.
It is also difficult to imagine how the agency could anticipate the extent
of pre-NPRM and post-final rule opposition and calibrate its early proposal
in ways that ensure that the outcome will nevertheless meet halfway
between industry and public health protection. For example, the data
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suggest that the number of changes the agency makes to weaken a rule
correlate with the number of industry commenters, a feature that the
agency presumably cannot control or predict in advance.
Finally, there is some evidence that the substance of some final HAPs
rules fell below what might be considered adequate for health protection.
One public interest litigator observed that EPA's HAPs rules were
sometimes less stringent than those in force in some states. 154 Perhaps even
more telling, EPA often fared badly in litigation brought by
environmentalists against its rules. Of the six HAPs rules that were
ultimately litigated to judgment, five involved successful challenges by
environmental groups, in some cases with strongly worded opinions that
chastised the agency for not adequately protecting the public health. 155 For
example, EPA repeatedly refused to set regulatory restrictions on toxic
pollutants if most of the industry sources had not already developed ways to
limit these toxic emissions. This is one among several examples of EPA's
deviations from the statutory terms in ways that compromised the public
health protection goals. 156 The case law thus suggests that the substantive
rules that emerged from the HAPs process-at least those that were
appealed-were not "just right," but tilted too heavily in favor of regulated
parties.
2. The Statute Leaves Little Room for Maneuvering?
A second source of potential comfort with the otherwise worrisome
implications of the study is the possibility that, at least in the case of HAPs
rulemakings, the public interest groups may not be engaged in the
substance of many of the rules because they believe the operable statutory
directions provide EPA with little discretion to make the HAPs standards
more lenient. Congress did provide a relatively precise definition of the
best performing industry. 157 Thus, the argument goes, there must be very
154. Informal interview with anonymous public interest litigator involved in HAPs
rulemakings during the 1990s, May 29, 2009 (interview in Chicago, Ill).
155. See, e.g, Sierra Club v. EPA, 479 F.3d 875, 881, 883 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (criticizing
EPA for failing to meet its mandate of protection). These cases are described in
considerably more detail in a working paper, Wendy Wagner, Are the Courts Guardians for the
Public Interest?: A Case Study of EPA's Air Toxic Emission Standards (2011) (unpublished paper) (on
file with author).
156. See, e.g., Sierra Club at 883 (stating that the court found EPA failed to set floors for
existing small tunner brick kilns and existing and new periodic brick kilns).
157. In the statute, Congress defined the best perfomers as the "average emission
limitation achieved by the best performing 12 percent of the existing sources" or, if there are
less than thirty sources in an industrial category or subcategory, based on the "average
emission limitation achieved by the best performing 5 sources." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3)(A)-
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little wiggle room in this particular standard-setting project, and whatever
remaining concessions EPA does make during the rulemakings are
inconsequential.
However, the possibility that the HAPs standard-setting decisions are
inconsequential seems refuted in part by the fact that so many industries
invest so much time and effort in engaging in these rulemaking processes.
If it is behaving rationally, industry is not likely to engage in an average of
eighty-four pre-NPRM informal (voluntary) communications for each
rule, 158 submit on average thirty-five comments for a standard, 159 or file
petitions for review of more than a dozen of these rules once
promulgated. 160  In fact, if the die is cast by the statute, then the
involvement of the thinly spread public interest groups also seems
misplaced. Further refuting the potential insignificance of the changes is
the fact that the majority of comments seek substantive changes to the
stringency or scope of the standard; only a minority of the comments raise
issues regarding compliance deadlines or paperwork requirements.161 In
any event, if public interest groups are not engaged in commenting on the
majority of the rulemakings, then they are not able to sue if the agency does
ultimately violate the statute in setting more lenient standards; stringent
statutory constraints on EPA's rulemaking assignment do not matter in
practice if nobody is able to enforce them. 62
(B) (2006). By contrast, in setting technology-based standards under the Clean Water Act,
EPA must consider the cost to industry, but in doing so, generally considers features such as
the age of equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, potential process
changes, nonwater quality, environmental impacts including energy requirements, economic
achievability, and other such factors as EPA Administrator deems appropriate. See, e.g.,
Effluent Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for the
Concentrated Aquatic Animal Production Point Source Category, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,891,
51,896 (Aug. 23, 2004) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 451); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(A)-(B)
(2006).
158. See Figure 3.
159. See Figure 4.
160. See Table 2.
161. The coders identified not only the number, but the type of changes made by EPA
in the final rule in their coding of the Federal Register preambles. The text provides the means
from this coding effort.
162. In theory, some of the "greener" sources of HAPs could challenge the rule in an
effort to impose more stringent requirements on their competitors; however, we are not
aware of any lawsuits in the HAPs or many other areas of environmental law when this
occurred.
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3. Political Branches to the Rescue?
A final mitigating possibility arises from the hope that the diffuse public
will be adequately protected in the end, if not from the strong ideological
commitment to public health protection from within the agency, but from
public-benefiting pressure exerted on the agency from without-through
the Executive Branch or even through Congress. 163  In this political
economy view, the political ballast-occurring through the White House or
Congress-would push back against industry domination and keep these
rules on a level playing field. While most would prefer that this political
counter-pressure take place "in the light" rather than outside public
oversight, as is currently the case, 164 the fact that it occurs at all may be
chalked up as a victory.
The likelihood of congressional intervention seems the most improbable,
both in theory and based on the existing data. EPA records congressional
letters and contacts in the rulemaking dockets. Yet for all ninety rules
combined, the number of congressional communications numbered forty-
six, with an average of about three letters from a member of Congress for
each of the sixteen rules. Beyond these formal written communications,
there is no evidence of congressional involvement in HAPs rulemakings.
There is no indication, for example, that Congress held hearings on any of
EPA's air toxic standards. While this evidence is not conclusive, it is at least
suggestive of the possibility that Congress did not play a meaningful role in
the HAPs standard-setting process.
The White House, primarily through 0MB, is more directly involved in,
reviewing many of the HAPs rules since at least 4 0 % of the rules were
identified as economically significant rules through a cost-benefit
analysis.1 65 In terms of the extent of changes weakening (or strengthening)
the rule during the notice-and-comment process, however, there were no
statistically significant differences between the economically significant and
nonsignificant rules. Thus, if 0MB is involved in the economically
significant rules, it is at least not involved in ways that lead to visible
differences in the agency's response to comments at the aggregate level.
163. Cf John D. Graham, Saving Lives through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA.
L. REv. 395, 473-74 (2008) (describing White House deliberations over features of EPA
rules that were not clear from regulatory impact analyses, but related to the costs and
benefits of the regulation).
164. See, e.g., Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 48, at 78, 85, 86 (noting that "97% of
EPA respondents stated that White House involvement was either not visible" or "only
somewhat visible to the public" and that a majority of EPA respondents believe the White
House is more susceptible to faction capture than EPA).
165. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2006).
[63:1
AKvEMPIRICAL STUDr OF EPA 'sAiR Toxic REGUL4TIONS
More to the point, the general literature provides no support for the
possibility that OMB regularly intervenes to make EPA's rules more
protective. Instead, recent studies of OMB identify a distinct anti-
environmental bent that is consistent across administrations. 166 One of the
primary justifications given for stronger White House and OMB
involvement, in fact, is to counteract the perceived ideological bent of
mission-oriented bureaucrats. 167 Thus, the available evidence provides little
reason for thinking that White House and OMB review, in the aggregate,
helps protect against regulatory imbalances that favor industry.
CONCLUSION: THE BUMPY EMPIRICAL ROAD AHEAD
This study reveals that at least some publicly important rules that emerge
from the regulatory state may be influenced heavily by regulated parties,
with little to no counterpressure from the public interest. 168 An important
next step is to determine how or whether the results from the study of HAPs
rulemakings extrapolate to other rulemaking activities, both within EPA
and to other agencies like the Occupational Health and Safety
Administration, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Consumer
Product Safety Commission. Certainly, the additional opportunities for
166. In their study of top EPA officials' view of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) during the Bush I and Clinton administrations, Professors
Bressman and Vandenbergh report that the strong majority (7 0%) reported that the "White
House readily sought changes that would reduce burdens on regulated entities, and veered
from those that would increase such burdens." Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 48, at
87. Professor Croley made similar, although not quite as strong observations about OIRA's
tilt during the White House review process: 56% of the meetings OIRA conducted to discuss
rulemakings were exclusively with industry as compared with 10% that were held exclusively
with public interest groups. See Croley, supra note 48, at 858, 865-66 (noting that over half
of the rules that were the subject of OIRA meetings were attended solely by persons
representing narrow interests and that EPA issued more major rules than any other agency
during the Reagan-Bush administration). Finally, in a General Accounting Office (GAO)
study, approximately 70% of the rules that OIRA "significantly affected" and for which
comments were available involved reinforcing the views of industry. U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-939, RULEMAKING: OMB's ROLE IN REVIEWS OF
AGENCIES' DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 11 (2003).
167. See, e.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 27, at 1261-62; Katzen, supra note 39, at 1505.
168. Ultimately, even modest reforms, like requiring agencies to record pre-NPRM and
post-final rule contacts with interest groups, might help redress some of the unpoliced
opportunities for lopsided interest group influence without imposing heavy costs on the
agency. A number of other reforms are also ultimately possible, such as recalibrating the
level ofjudicial scrutiny to the extent of pluralistic engagement by affected parties. Yet these
reform discussions go well beyond the four corners of the instant empirical study and its
immediate implications for administrative law reform. See generally Wagner, supra note 77, at
1431 (noting that there is "information capture" and a significant design flaw in
administrative flow of information).
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interest group influence highlighted in this study, most of which are only
poorly accounted for by public transparency requirements in the APA,
would seem to carry over to some rulemakings in these other agencies.
Moreover, the incentives for an agency to "get it right" in the proposed
rule, which invites extensive participation during pre-NPRM, also would
seem to infect other agency rulemakings, since this incentive appears to
stem from administrative law and not from statutory directions that are
unique to EPA. Because imbalanced participation appears to be a
recurring phenomenon in the limited empirical literature bearing on the
subject and is also explained by relatively simple rational choice models for
both regulated industry and public interest groups, it would in fact be
surprising if most complex, lengthy rulemakings in other agencies are not
beset by some pluralistic deficiencies. Of course, an occasional rule might
overcome these odds and become accessible, which would in turn invite
great public interest activity. Based on the growing body of evidence,
however, this may be the exception rather than the rule.
Ultimately, even if interest group participation in rules like EPA's HAPs
rules is badly skewed, and even if this leads to rule changes that favor the
dominant group, it is not clear what the substantive implications of this
imbalance might be. Research methods that measure the substantive
implications of skewed influence-specifically whether changes weakening
the rule are meaningful-could shed valuable light on the actual
consequence of imbalanced participation on resultant rulemakings. At this
point, however, we are unaware of such methods.
There is a great deal that we do not know about the administrative
process that we need to know to assess how well it works in advancing the
goals set for it. Hopefully the findings generated by this Article, as well as
by the few studies that preceded it, will pique scholarly interest in the
empirical study of agency rulemakings. We encourage others to join us in
the effort to increase our understanding of agency rulemaking, which for far
too long has been viewed as a black box impervious to scrutiny.
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APPENDIX: EMPIRICAL METHODS
This Appendix provides a more detailed description of the methods for
data collection and analysis used to generate the findings discussed in this
study.
1. Docket Indices and Final Rule Preambles
Once the HAPs rules were selected as the focus of study, the first order
of business was to identify the individual rules within this larger set for
coding, which proved more difficult than expected. As a first order matter,
we concluded that it was preferable to study all of the HAPs rules since we
did not know how similar the rules would be and were not comfortable
relying on a subset of the data. 169 Yet this still left the identification of the
individual rulemakings. EPA has promulgated 124 final, industry-specific
HAPs rules in 40 C.F.R. Part 63, but several rules had to be merged
because EPA created them in the same rulemaking process. 7 ( Another
169. We also excluded four sets of HAPs rules promulgated at other parts of 40 C.F.R.,
and not at Part 63 (NESHAPs for asbestos, benzene waste operations, the Clean Air
mercury rule, and hazardous waste combustion). We excluded these rules because all four
are quite different than the Part 63 HAPs: They either overlap with other statutes (i.e.,
hazardous waste) or were promulgated before the 1990 amendments, which was the basis
for all of the Part 63 standards. We plan to study these four rules in an expanded version of
this same study.
170. Twenty-two subparts were combined into six units because they were created by
the same final rule and their creation is documented by one docket (Subparts AA and BB
were merged as a single final rule published at 64 Fed. Reg. 31,358 (June 10, 1999) (docket
no. A-94-02); Subparts DD, 00, PP, QQ RR, and VV were merged as a single final rule
published at 61 Fed. Reg. 34,140 (July 1, 1996), (docket no. A-92-16); Subparts HH and
HHH were merged as a single final rule published at 64 Fed. Reg. 32,610 (June 17, 1999)
(docket no. A-94-04); Subparts BBBBBB and CCCCCC were merged as a single final rule
published at 73 Fed. Reg. 1916 (Jan. 10, 2008) (docket no. EPA-HQ-OAR-2006-0406);
Subparts DDDDDD, EEEEEE, FFFFFF, and GGGGGG were merged as a single final rule
published at 72 Fed. Reg. 2930 (Jan. 23, 2007) (docket no. EPA-HQ-OAR-2006-0510);
Subparts LLLLLL, MMMMMIM, NNNNNN,OOOOOO, PPPPPP, and QQ.QQQQwere
merged as a single final rule published at 72 Fed. Reg. 38,864 (July 16, 2007) (docket no.
EPA-HQ-OAR-2006-0897). Nine subparts were combined into three units because they
were created by the same final rule, however their creation is documented in several dockets:
Subparts F, G, H, I were merged as a single final rule at 59 Fed. Reg. 19,402 (Apr. 22, 1994)
(docket numbers: A-89-10, A-90-19, A-90-20, A-90-21, A-90-22, and A-90-23);
Subparts JJJJJ and KKKKK were merged as a single final rule published at 68 Fed. Reg.
26,690 (May 16, 2003) (docket numbers: OAR-2002-0054 and OAR-2002-0055);
Subparts RRRRRR, SSSSSS, and TFTT were published as a single final rule at 72 Fed.
Reg. 73,180 (Dec. 26, 2007) (docket numbers: EPA-HQ-OAR-2006-0424, EPA-HQ-
OAR-2006-0360, and OAR-2006-0940).
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twelve rules had to be excluded because of difficulties getting the dockets. 171
Our study thus examines all of the HAPs rules promulgated at 40 C.F.R.
Part 63, with the noted exceptions (n=90).
Because of the difficulty and time involved in obtaining archived records
from EPA, the data were drawn from two publicly accessible documents
available for each HAPs rule-the rulemaking docket index 172 and the final
rule published in the Federal Register.
The docket index is the source of data used to measure interest group
participation. These indices provide a detailed inventory of many of the
communications, documents, and comments the agency considered in
preparing the final rule. In many HAPs rulemakings, the docket index
includes more than 100 pages of entries of information, meetings, telephone
calls, and comments that are logged in throughout the life cycle of a
rulemaking. The agency docket also contains all communications
occurring during the notice-and-comment period. While information
received pre- or post-notice and comment that affects the agency need not
be logged in, these HAPs docket indices, even in their incomplete form, still
provide a great deal of information about how long the agency worked on
the rule, at least some of the contacts it had in drafting the rule proposal,
and who participated in various stages of the rulemaking process.
Coders were instructed to categorize each contact in the docket index by
participant's affiliation and then record the number of contacts for each
group. The types of contacts categorized included factual memoranda,
written correspondence, meetings and telephone calls, written comments,
and intergovernmental communications. This identification of participant
affiliation was relatively straightforward for most entities and tracked the
categories used by Professors Yackee and Yackee and Professor
Coglianese: 173 EPA contractor, industry, industry association, public
interest group, state regulator, governmental entity acting as a regulated
party (i.e., Department of Defense or sewer district), unaffiliated party, and
other. When coders were not able to determine the affiliation of a
participant, they conducted a Google search; if that failed, they consulted
Wagner; and if she could not determine the affiliation, the party would be
classified as "other."
171. These additional excluded subparts are S, SS, TT, UU, WW, YY, XX, EEE,
FFFF, HHHHH, SSSSS, and TTTTT. 40 C.F.R. pt. 63. Several of these were created
within the same rulemaking process. If we could have gotten the docket information for
these subparts it would have resulted in another six units for analysis.
172. About 70% of the legacy indices are available on Regulations.gov. The rest had to
be requested through the EPA docket center or were available as electronic dockets on
Regulations.gov.
173. See Coglianese, supra note 41, at 71, 73; Yackee & Yackee, supra note 20, at 132.
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The final rule provides our source of data for assessing interest group
influence, as well as some other basic features of the rule-the rule's length,
whether it was considered "significant" by EPA, and whether it affected
small business. We initially attempted to compare the actual requests for
changes filed by each interest group in their submitted comments with final
rule changes following the content analysis methods developed by
Professors Yackee and Yackee. 174 Given the large amount of comments
and the multiple requests for change in each, it soon became clear that this
would not be possible with a limited research budget and might not
produce reliable results given the size of the records and rulemakings. We
ultimately determined that EPA's section on its response to significant
comments-a section that is provided in every final rule-provided an
approximate barometer of both the nature of all significant requests for
changes that EPA received and how EPA responded to each of them. 175
In its discussion of the major comments and its individual responses,
EPA always provides a summary of a major comment first and follows it
with its specific response. In each rule there are often many-usually
dozens of these individual comment-responses-to explain the changes
made in the final rule. Coders could thus not simply determine whether
the rule was changed overall in ways that favored industry or not, following
the methods of Professors Yackee and Yackee; 17 6 there were too many
requests for change. Instead coders were directed to code each request for
change separately according to the type of change (i.e., substantive change;
change in the coverage of the rule, change in monitoring, change in
recordkeeping). The coders then assessed, based EPA's summary of the
comment, whether the request for change sought a stronger or weaker
regulatory requirement, according to the categories in Table 3 below.
Finally, the coder was asked to determine, based on EPA's response,
whether the request for change was accepted or rejected by EPA in the
final rule. When coders were not able to easily code a request for change
following the categories in the coding sheet, the protocol involved
174. See, e.g., Yackee & Yackee, supra note 20 at 131-32.
175. For an example of this section, see EPA, National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Brick and Structural Clay Products Manufacturing; and
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Clay Ceramics
Manufacturing, 68 Fed. Reg. 26,690, 26,694-706 (May 16, 2003). While EPA's
characterization of what constitutes a major or significant comment is somewhat self-serving,
a separate, supporting document that contains EPA's response to all comments provides an
accessible check against the agency's characterization and could be used in litigation; we
thus suspect that EPA does a relatively good job culfing out the major comments in an
honest and straightforward way.
176. See, e.g., Yackee & Yackee, supra note 20, at 131-32.
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consulting a set of default rules intended to ensure consistent results; if that
failed, the question would be raised to Wagner; and ultimately to record a
question mark ("?") if the issue could not be resolved.
Response/ Decline Decline Agree to Agree to
Change Weaken Strengthen Weaken strengthen
Table 3: Categories for Rule Changes in "Rule" Coding Sheet
Two sets of research assistants were trained in how to code either the
docket or the rule using a coding sheet designed specifically for the HAPs
rules through a training session and one-to-one practice session with
Wagner. More extensive training-typically involving three sample rules-
was required of research assistants conducting the rules coding.'77 The
coding data were entered into Excel initially and then converted to Stata
format for ease of analysis.178 In the statistical analysis, we link the docket
and rule together not only to evaluate general features-such as the
balance in participation during the pre-NPRM and comment period-but
to link those features to how the agency responds to significant comments
from affected groups in a single rule. The strength of the relationship
between industry dominance during the comment period and significant
changes weakening a rule is tested using simple statistical correlations.
Intercoder reliability on both rules and dockets was also evaluated near
the end of the study. 15% of the rules and 8% of the dockets were coded
by at least two separate research assistants and the results were compared.
Rather than test for exact matches, we investigated whether the tallies were
within 20% of each other for each cell or combination of related cells (i.e.,
were the coders finding roughly the same number of industry
correspondence pre-NPRI). The reliability was perfect (1.0) on simple
coding cells-for example whether a rule was economically "significant," a
finding that EPA makes in very clear fashion. On the more subjective
decisions-for example, whether EPA rejected a substantive change in
coverage that weakened the rule-the reliability scores were lower and
must be qualified, sometimes heavily. In this Article, we generally use only
data that had strong reliability scores, above 75% reliability. When
reliability drops below this level, we note that fact in footnotes. In some
cases, reliability is difficult to achieve because of the small numbers of
177. All of the selected coders were second-year law students, third-year law students, or
L.L.M. students. Virtually all of them also had taken coursework in environmental or
administrative law or both.
178. The statistical analysis was performed using Stata 10.1.
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changes requested; a difference between one and two changes is larger, in
percentage terms, in the quantitative assessment of reliability than a
difference between 200 and 201 requests for changes.
2. Unified Agenda Database and EPA's Hazardous Air Pollutants Table
In addition to coding final rules and dockets, information was collected
on post-final rule activity through three publicly available sources. The first
source of information came from formal reports of rule reconsiderations or
litigation recorded by EPA in the unified agenda published in the Federal
Register. OMB's online database 179 provided data for post-1995 Unified
Agendas180 and Westlaw searches provided data for the earlier (1990 to 1995)
unified agendas. 181 The hits were screened and NESHAPs rules (which are
the HAPs rules) were pulled out, excluding the few that were not
promulgated in 40 C.F.R. Part 63. The resulting hits were sorted into one
pile for reconsideration and judicial challenges to the substance of the rule;
and a second pile for deadline suits. After eliminating redundancies and
locating the first date that the entry was published in the unified agenda,
the dates and Regulation Identification Numbers for all of these petitions
for reconsideration, petitions seeking judicial review of a rule, and deadline
suits were entered into Excel. For the first two categories we were able to
identify the filing parties either through the Unified Agenda, or when that was
not possible, by tracking back to the final rule that ultimately resulted from
the petition and locating the filing party in EPA's preambulatory discussion.
We were not able to identify the identities of the filing parties for deadline
suits before this Article went to press.
Another source of information about post-final rule activity came from
the docket indices. In some cases, EPA records petitions for
reconsideration or litigation that follows promulgation of the final rule. We
supplemented the information collected from the unified agenda data with
179. See Advanced Search - Select Publication(s), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaAdvancedSearch (last visited Feb.. 3, 2011).
180. Advanced Search - Select Publication(s), OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY
AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGINFO.GOV, http://www.reginfo.gov/
public/do/eAgendaAdvancedSearch (select "Search all available publications;" then select
"Environmental Protection Agency," then "Air and Radiation;" search for
"reconsideration" in the "Terms" box, or check the option next to 'Judicial" under "Legal
Deadline - Source") (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
181. We searched the Federal Register database in Westlaw with the following search
terms: .... UNIFIED AGENDA" & (NESHAP* W/150 (JUDICIAL
RECONSIDERATION)) & DATE(AFT 1/1/1990 & BEFORE 1/1/1996)."
WESTAW.COM, http://www.westlaw.com (search for "Federal Register" under "Search for
a database;" input search query above without quotes) (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
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this additional information. In comparison to the information collected
from the unified agenda data, docket recordings were quite limited; most of
the petition activity reported in the unified agenda was not logged into the
docket for the corresponding rule. Only one judicial challenge from a
docket index was not listed in the unified agenda.
Finally, an EPA online webpage was used to provide the life history of
most of the HAPs rules182 in order to track post-final rule revision activity.
The date and nature of each revision for each rule subpart was tracked and
recorded.
Together, these data sources provide at least preliminary evidence of
what happens to EPA's HAPs rules after they are promulgated as final.
3. News Data
As part of an exploratory part of the study, discussed in Section IV,
partial data on the media coverage of air toxic issues was also collected with
particular focus on news coverage of the emissions of air toxics from
stationary sources. The "major news" database in LexisNexis was searched
for the entire period of the regulation of hazardous air pollutants using
broad search terms. 183 Extraneous articles were culled out, specifically
excluding articles on particulates if there was no mention of hazardous air
pollutants; articles on hazardous air pollutants from mobile sources; and
articles on hazardous air pollutants resulting from the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001. News was categorized by topic and an article was not
considered relevant unless two or more sentences were devoted to a
discussion of air toxics. Data was entered on: the category of the article; the
type of newspaper (top eight in circulation; top 100 in circulation; or not
listed as a top 100 newspaper);184 and the date of the article. Because these
data are being used in a more exploratory way, intercoder reliability was
not measured.
182. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants,
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/mactfnlalph.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
183. Our LexisNexis search was as follows: "air w/10 (toxic or hazardous or hap* or
mact or 112 or neshap*) w/50 (standard* or limit) & (epa or "environmental protection
agency") and date aft (1/1/1990)." LEXIsNEXIS.coM, http://www.lexisnexis.com (select
"News and Business" tab; check the box next to "Major Newspapers" and select "Go"; input
search query above without quotes) (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
184. BurrellesLuce.com, 2010 Top Media Outlets: Newspapers, Blogs, Consumer
Magazines & Social Networks (updated May 2010), http://www.burrelesluce.com/
system/files/BL_2010-Top_MediaList_UpdatedMay/o202010.pdf.
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